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The popularity and influence of professional sports is at an all-time high. No
longer just a nice diversion or "national pastime", sports is now, in fact, a thriving
industry that permeates nearly every facet of this country's culture. Along with that
popularity, of course, comes money, and the tools with which to harvest it are the
stadiums and arenas being erected in record numbers around the country. They are
expected to be conduits of financial well-being, both for the teams and their host cities,
and are the subject of debate in nearly every medium to large community in North
America.
Sports arenas are now absolutely vital to the teams they house. Years ago, teams
that were worth the most and, often, played the best, were those located in the biggest
cities. A steady stream of ticket-buying fans was all that was needed to stay financially
afloat. Later, fat television contracts allowed all teams to share in the profits, but the
growth of those monies slowed, while player salaries continued to escalate. Now, the
revenue source that teams, large and small-market alike, seek to capitalize on are those
produced by the facilities they play in. As explained in a recent expose on the subject of
professional sports by the Dallas Morning News:
More than ever before, the additional money that owners want comes from the
stadium or arena. Baseball, football, basketball, and hockey teams are converting their
facilities into cash cows, thanks largely to luxury suites and generous leases. The most
profitable teams will be those that can take the most money out of where they play.
That's why there's a slew of facilities being built. That's why a record number of
franchises are talking about moving. That's why owners are cozying up to corporate
America.
'
The pro sports arena is also important to cities because sports teams are visualized
by communities as catalysts of both economic development and civic pride. As such, the
fields they play on are the primary means to reach one or both of those ends. That is, the

facilities are important to the teams; the teams are important to the cities; therefore, the
facilities are important to the cities. Cities are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to
build and renovate sports venues, often doing so before actually getting teams to fill them.
A building boom is underway, fueled by the professional sports team's quest to
increase its value, meet the ever-rising salary demands of its players, maximize the
portion of income it is not required to share, and defray the cost of modern-day
ownership. The boom is especially prevalent in hockey and basketball, but construction
cost totals will rise even further as costlier single-purpose baseball and football stadiums
come on line.
The methods of funding these projects are as varied as the cities and teams that
are doing so. The incredible cost of today's arenas makes simple or standard financing
packages impossible. (The New England Patriots' Foxboro Stadium cost only $6.7
million to build in 1977;
2
the New York Yankees are discussing a new stadium that would
cost over 5/ billion 1 ) Public money, through taxes, bonds, even lotteries, continues to
provide the bulk of the financing. Private team debt is undertaken more often now,
though, as voters and officials have grown weary of what seems to be a never-ending
series of ever-increasing demands by the teams. Revenue-generating amenities, like
luxury suites, are only occasionally used to help pay for construction, furthering the
argument against public subsidies for such projects.
A myriad of legal and political aspects surround the issue, and the criticism of pro
sports has increased right along with the wave of new construction. Critics refer to the
professional sports leagues as monopolistic "cartels" that use a host of special exemptions
to assert bargaining powers over the cities that host them. Baseball's anti-trust exemption,
the use of tax-exempt bonds to build stadiums, and the leagues' policies on franchise

relocation and public ownership are among the items that continue to be challenged by
skeptical citizens, economists, and legislators.
This report attempts to analyze the many dynamics of professional sports as they
relate to the construction of arenas and stadiums by examining:
( 1
)
The reasons sports teams are viewed with such importance by the cities that
have, or wish to have, them;
(2) why the stadiums and arenas they play in, and the revenues these venues
produce, are of such interest to the teams;
(3) how these facilities actually produce the much-desired revenues;
(4) how many of today's stadium projects are funded; and
(5) the tangential issues interacting with pro sports that may affect future stadium
projects and the leagues themselves.

CHAPTER 2
THE IMPORTANCE OF SPORTS
Before examining the importance of the arenas and stadiums teams play in, it is
helpful to understand the growth and popularity of sports itself and the purposes cities feel
teams serve beyond simple entertainment.
The Growth of Sports
Despite astronomical player salaries, labor disputes, franchise moves and threats,
and an industry, as a whole, that seems to have turned its back on the "average" ticket-
buying sports fan, the popularity of professional sports has never been higher. Sports as a
business has grown to the point where the actual athletic contests are dwarfed, money-
wise, by the facility revenues they generate and the other industries they influence, as
noted by Financial World magazine: "Sports is not simply another big business. It is one
of the fastest growing industries in the U.S., and it is intertwined with virtually every
aspect of the economy - from media and apparel to food and advertising ... sports is
everywhere, accompanied by the sound of a cash register ringing incessantly."4
• spending by U.S. and Canadian corporations to sponsor sporting events grew
15 percent annually between 1988 and 1993, from $1.2 billion to $2.4
billion.
5
• network television sports advertising billings, though growing slower than in
the 1970s and 1980s, still increased from $1.8 billion in 1989 to $2.2 billion
in 1993; cable television billings for 1993 were $714 million, more than twice
1988's figure.
6
• retail sales of licensed merchandise for the four major pro sports reached $8.7
billion in 1993, a 34 percent annual climb from 1988's $2 billion. 7 The NBA

alone has seen merchandise sales climb from $750 million in 1990 to $2.5
billion in 1994.
8
These secondary windfalls, of course, are rooted in the growth of professional
sports itself. In 1967, there were a combined 61 franchises in the National Football
League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL),
and Major League Baseball (MLB). 9 Today, there are 113, with two more MLB teams
scheduled to begin play in 1998. Much of this is simple supply and demand: with a larger
population, and a greater percentage interested in watching sports, more teams have come
on line. Much of the growth, though, may be attributed to cities - government officials,
business leaders, and citizens - attempting to piggyback the popularity of sports to
increased prosperity. By getting, keeping, or even just attempting to get a team,
communities seek either to (1) develop or spur economic activity, or (2) achieve a higher
perceived status by becoming a "major league" city.
Sports Teams as Economic Engines
In the 1960s and 1970s, city governments attempted to right the wrongs of the
past by implementing massive social programs designed to empower the poor,
uneducated, and racially oppressed. Later in the '70s and into the 1980s, as economies
reached the crises, or at least stagnation, stage, big-city mayors like Edward Koch of New
York, Federico Pena of Denver, and William Hudnut of Indianapolis sought to re-define
local government's role as the orchestrator of economic activity and growth. 10 Sports
franchises became, and still are, a popular means to that end. Constructing massive arenas
and stadiums, the logic goes, will generate both short and long-term economic windfalls ~
the short being the design and construction dollars spent both on the facility and the
supporting road and utility infrastructure; the long being economic development in the

surrounding neighborhood (restaurants, bars, and other retailers), increased tax revenues
and property values, and the creation of more jobs.
Virtually all proposed sports facilities carry the promise of such economic
influence. When Oklahoma City voters agreed in 1993 to a five-year sales tax increase to
fund a multi-purpose arena, baseball stadium, and miscellaneous other facilities, the mam
selling point was economic impact. The city's funding consultant stated: "This was not a
sports or cultural or arts issue. This was an economic development and jobs issue. The
idea of creating an infrastructure to spur economic growth was a major priority."
Denver voters approved more than $220 million worth of central business district
spending in 1988 as part of a "master plan for downtown growth" that included the
construction of a new baseball stadium.
12
Business and government leaders proposing new or renovated sports facilities
usually commission official studies to demonstrate the impact their addition will have.
Such studies often cite an economic "multiplier effect" as a theoretical byproduct of a
large, new activity such as a stadium: an initial expenditure (a family of four going to see
a ballgame, for example) leads to further spending (gasoline, parking, dining, other stops
on the way to and from the game, etc.). 13 These calculations may not be good forecasts,
though, as multiplier effects may be overestimated or inaccurate; the jobs created may be
seasonal and/or low-paying; and the money spent by fans is usually discretionary and
would be spent even if the team or facility was not there. 14 Economist Robert Baade,
noting that multiplier effects do not account for the money not spent on other goods or
services, argues: "The public sector may be helping to develop a particular segment of the
economy at the expense of another." 1
Economic studies and estimates, whether supporting or refuting an arena's
positive influence, are usually questioned by the opposing side, but either argument

appears negated by the wide disparity of data purporting to show the financial impact (or
lack thereof) teams have on their communities. Economist Baade, in a 1994 study of 32
cities that gained or lost professional sports franchises or stadiums over the past 30 years,
found that only two showed "statistically significant" changes in their economic activity.
In 1987, however, the accounting firm of Touche Ross estimated the "probable impact"
of a baseball team in northern New Jersey to be $1 18 million. 17 A study conducted at the
University of Pennsylvania concluded that sports teams contributed $500 million to the
Philadelphia economy in 1983 alone, while another study at the same school at
approximately the same time found the economic contribution of sports teams to be
negligible.
18
Though assuming an economic benefit will accompany new sports venues is, at
best, an arguable premise, the best development efforts appear to be those that include
sports venues as a piece of a larger revitalization plan, one that carefully considers siting
and matters of infrastructure, such as parking. The multipurpose stadiums built between
1965 and 1976 were often located outside the city's downtown and came equipped with
acres of parking lots. 14 This proved to be counter-productive to economic development
because consumers (fans) simply came and went, producing no "multiplier effect" on the
surrounding area. 19 Recent new stadiums, like those in Denver, Cleveland, and Baltimore,
have been "integrated" into downtown neighborhoods (the way old-fashioned parks like
Fenway in Boston used to be), helping to generate business by forcing fans to park
downtown and walk to and from the stadium. 14 New Orleans provides the rare example
of ample sports arena parking actually helping economic development. Though plagued
by "legendary" cost overruns, the Superdome is widely credited with benefitting the
downtown area, unwittingly, by attracting developers interested in using the arena's
substantial and low-cost parking lots for its potential clients.
'
5 Though high in cost,

Cleveland's Gateway Project, which included new basketball and baseball arenas and was
also part of a larger development plan, has apparently succeeded in its mission of
restoring public faith in that city's downtown. The project's director claims "we've had
1 8 new restaurants open downtown since Jacobs Field opened [and] six housing
developments underway downtown near the Gateway. We're renovating old buildings
into condos, offices, and the like. The city is alive now on weeknights."20 Such was also
the case in Baltimore, where the construction of an aquarium and new retail space were
among the projects that accompanied the Orioles' new baseball park. 21
With regard to issues of planning, siting, and economic impact the Houston
Chronicle recently offered an interesting contrast in outcomes by comparing the new
baseball parks in Chicago and Denver, both of which were funded mostly with public
monies: 12
• Comiskey Park opened in Chicago in 1991, "born out of panic, with little
community-wide planning," after years of relocation threats and siting battles -
an example of "planning with a gun to your head."
• Coors Field opened in Denver in 1995 as part of a 1988 downtown "master
plan," after years of coordinated effort and consensus between citizens,
government, and team - "the crown jewel in a nice crown."
• Comiskey Park adjoins a turbulent neighborhood and offers views of low-rent
housing towers and barbed-wire fences.
• Coors Field is "nestled gendy" in Denver's downtown with spectacular views
of the Rocky Mountains.
• Comiskey Park is among baseball's worst in attendance, has plenty of adjacent
parking, and "has had no residual effect on the surrounding neighborhood."

• Coors Field leads all of baseball in attendance, provides fewer than 4,000
parking spaces, and has "significantly" impacted downtown retail business and
transformed a nearby warehouse district into "a thriving residential region of
lofts and apartments."
Sports Teams as Image Builders
While tangible economic benefits may be difficult to predict or prove, the
psychological importance many residents and leaders of towns attach to professional
teams is not. Author Charles Euchner, who has written a civics-oriented book about the
dynamics ofteams and cities, believes citizens view their teams not only as a form of
entertainment, but as a means to define their community and eclipse mundane or troubling
matters:
The emotional hold a team has on its home city stems partly from its ability to embody
and enhance the city's identity. Whether on the playing field or as the object of
competition with a city that hopes to lure them away, the "home" team is a symbol for
the whole cornmunity ... A city's identification with a sports team creates vivid
symbolism of a common interest, but it also washes away other less dramatic concerns
that might be more important for the community, like schools, parks, housing, and
libraries.
22
Furthermore, people view sports teams differently than other industries. A consultant for
Phoenix' effort to build a new baseball stadium stated: "You don't have people running
around with the Intel semi-conductors on T-shirts and rooting for the next great
microchip. There are a lot of non-monetary benefits of sports."23
Communities often equate getting a major league sports team with becoming a
"major league" city. Consider Nashville, Tennessee, where voters in May 1996 approved
a bond issue to fund a football stadium with no team, as construction of a $120 million
multi-purpose arena with no hockey or basketball team approached completion.
Nashville's mayor, prior to the football stadium vote, contended that it was a vote either
for or against the future of the city and its perceived status: "It's almost turned into a

cultural vote ... it deals with fundamental questions about what kind of city we're going to
be ... it puts you in a slightly different category - your peers are San Francisco and
Chicago, not Mobile."
24 An Indianapolis city planner noted that the Hoosier Dome gave
citizens "confidence in the city and encouraged them to think that downtown is an OK
place to be."
13
Pepperdine University economics professor Dean Bairn commented on the
prospect of baseball's Giants re-locating: "San Jose is the second-largest city in
California, but if you asked people what the second-largest city in California is, they
would say San Francisco or San Diego or Sacramento. But if San Jose gets the Giants,
suddenly it's a big town."
25
The unique stature of sports franchises is enhanced by their exclusivity. 26 That is,
because not every town has one, it becomes a more valuable commodity. The end result
is that sports teams often command more power and bargaining leverage than other local
industries, even though the other businesses may supply more jobs and tangible economic
impact to the community. This causes cities of all sizes to make unusually generous
concessions and offers in order to get or keep a team in town. The city of Irwindale,
California paid the Los Angeles Raiders $10 millionyus/ to listen to their proposal for





IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME*
The most illustrative cases of a community's willingness to obtain a professional
team, and thereby reach the "major leagues" in terms of image and status, are those
teamless cities, like Nashville, in which stadiums or arenas are built with the hope of
enticing a new or relocated franchise. Though increasing in frequency, this practice is not
new, having started in 1953, when Milwaukee built a baseball stadium to lure the Boston
Braves.
28
The strategy of building before getting a team is almost always linked to hopes of
the afore-mentioned economic impact. In Oklahoma City, community leaders suggest
that such impact has already occurred, even though $285 million worth of taxpayer-
funded, new and renovated facilities are still in the design or pre-construction phase, and
no professional teams have, as yet, been signed on as tenants. They point to Southwest
Airlines' recent decision to locate a 1000-job reservation center there based, in part, on
the atmosphere it felt would be provided by a more vibrant downtown. Taxpayer-
financed incentive packages offered to lure major corporations three times in the 1980s
and early 1990s were all unsuccessful, including a United Airlines maintenance facility
which went, instead, to Indianapolis, a city which had just based its own revitalization on
building arenas and acquiring a "major league" image. 29
This "ifyou build it ..." strategy is not confined to major league professional
sports or to the United States. In June 1996, the Ventura (CA) city council approved
preliminary plans to build a $19 million baseball stadium in order to attract a minor
league franchise.
30
In the mid to late 1980s, several towns in Florida began building
elaborate spring training baseball complexes meant to lure teams and, often, revive
downtown economies and images. 31 Design and construction of over $1 billion worth of
11

new sports facilities were begun in Berlin with the hope of attracting the 2000 Olympic
Games, 32 though the venture failed when the Games were awarded to Sydney, Australia.
The line from the movie Field ofDreams applies to a long and growing list of
hopeful communities that decided the best way to get a team was to build a facility, then
convince a league expansion committee or disgruntled-in-their-current-home owner to
relocate.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis is perhaps the most famous example of luring a sports team by
offering a new facility and favorable terms to an owner unhappy in his current situation.
The Baltimore Colts, after years of attempting to gain public financial support for a new
stadium, left (literally) in the middle of the night of March 12, 1984 for the nearly-
completed $80 million Hoosier Dome in downtown Indianapolis. 33 The dome, which
was financed by corporate endowments and a one percent tax on food and beverages,34
was only a piece of an enormous revitalization plan that saw 20 major construction
projects and over $2 billion pumped into the downtown area over a 25-year period. 35 By
constructing an accompanying convention center and increasing hotel space (every current
downtown room is either new or restored since 1984), the dome was planned to be
economically viable even if the Colts had not come. 36 Their relocation, however, was the
foundation of a plan to transform Indianapolis into a midwestern mecca for pro and
amateur sports. The city convinced eight amateur athletic associations and governing
boards to relocate their headquarters there
37
and hosted the US National Sports Festival in
1982 and the 1987 Pan American Games. 35 Years after the fact, some experts have
downplayed the positive impact of the dome, NFL team, and entire plan, 37 but the effort
may have been worth it just in terms of public relations. Witness the following headlines:
Indianapolis: A Born-Again Hoosier Diamond in the Rust (Smithsonian, June 1987)
Indianapolis
' Downtown Resurgence; 12-year Effort at Revitalization is Huge Success
12

for Rust Belt City (Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1986)
A Rust-Belt Relic 's New Shine (Newsweek, September 9, 1985)
"India-no-place " No More; The Subject ofa Joke Gains Major League Attention
(Time, June 11, 1984)
Of importance today, the terms of the agreement between team and city, which
appeared generous in 1984, are now outdated as far as the Colts are concerned. Along
with the new dome, the city built the team a $7.5 million indoor practice facility and
guaranteed that ticket and broadcast revenues would be at least $7 million annually for 10
years.
38 Now, the guarantees have expired, and the agreement allows Indianapolis to keep
most of the revenue gathered by the stadium, now called the RCA Dome, including the
$10 million "naming rights" fee paid by the RCA company. In keeping with the town's
original economy-via-sports plan, this money is being used to help build a new stadium
for the town's minor league baseball affiliate and possibly to renovate the NBA Pacers'
arena.
39
This means nothing to the Colts, however, who, though not threatening to leave,
want to re-negotiate the terms of its lease in order to keep more of the stadium revenues. 38
Tampa Bay, Florida
If Indianapolis is the most famous, then Tampa Bay must be the longest-running
and most tumultuous example of the "'ifyou build it ..." strategy. The long odyssey of the
Tampa / St. Petersburg effort to obtain a major league baseball team appears to be ending
successfully, as the expansion Tampa Bay Devil Rays will begin play in the St. Petersburg
ThunderDome in 1998, but even the most ardent supporters of this effort probably
wonder if the end will justify the financial and political means.
"You've got to stick a shovel in the ground before you even approach baseball"
was the quote of the first executive director of the Pinellas Sports Authority (PSA),
established in 1977 for the express purpose of acquiring a major league team. 40 Years of
discussing funding options and courting baseball owners passed until 1983, when the PSA
13

and county commission approved plans to build a $60 million, multi-purpose, air
conditioned facility by selling bonds backed by a tourist development tax. After months
of debate and public meetings, the St. Petersburg City Council voted in 1986 to build the
stadium, and ground was broken in November of that year with a revised estimated cost
of $85 million. By the time the stadium, originally named the Florida Suncoast Dome,
opened in March of 1990, the taxpayer cost alone had more than doubled to $138
million.
In 1 986, talks began with the Chicago White Sox, who were unhappy with their
facility, while across the bay in Tampa, a separate group led competitive efforts to bring
baseball to that city. The White Sox appeared headed to Florida in the spring of 1988, as
a preliminary lease was drafted and funding for a new Chicago stadium fell through in the
Illinois legislature. Cm the night of the last day of that body's legislative session,
however, with a live television audience in Florida watching, funding for a new White
Sox park was passed, beginning a series of close calls for hopeful Tampa-area baseball
fans.
40 The private Tampa groups nearly purchased the Minnesota Twins ( 1984),
Oakland A's (1985), and Texas Rangers (1988), only to be thwarted by last-minute deals
or concessions by the teams' current cities. Though Pinellas and Hillsborough county
officials finally agreed in 1989 that a joint Tampa / St. Petersburg effort was more likely
to yield success, hopes were again dashed in 1991 when baseball awarded expansion
teams to Denver and Miami, citing a poor financial structure of the Tampa Bay
investment group. Other buys of the Seattle Mariners and San Francisco Giants fell
through in 1992. Finally, after two years of discussions and proposals, baseball awarded
new teams to Tampa Bay and Phoenix in March of 1995.
So much time passed between conception and obtaining a team, however, the
stadium is virtually obsolete in comparison with the new standards of what an arena
14

should feature, and will require close to $50 million worth of improvements to ready it
for baseball. What began as a $60 million "investment" will open for baseball with a
price tag of over $200 million. 41
City of St. Petersburg tourist development taxes $1 16 million
Pinellas County hotel/motel "bed" taxes $56 million
State of Florida grants and rebates $28 million
Team ownership private investment $3 million
St. Louis, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland
These two cities held fast to the belief that the public should not be involved with
funding a private enterprise's facility, subsequently waved good-bye to their NFL teams
(Cardinals and Colts), then years later spent substantially more to build new stadiums for
new teams than asked for by the original teams.
After refusing to fund a new stadium for the NFL Cardinals and watching them
leave for Arizona in 1988, St. Louis decided to build a 100 percent taxpayer-subsidized,
$280 million convention center and domed stadium complex in the hopes of re-acquiring
a football team. Opened in the fall of 1995, and again billed as part of a downtown
economic revitalization, the dome and convention center project followed a new $135
million hockey arena and a light rail system that connects the dome, hockey arena, and
Busch Stadium baseball facility to the airport. 42
The football team enticement effort was successful, as the Los Angeles Rams left
a poorly-attended and low-revenue arena in 1995 for St. Louis, which, unlike
Indianapolis, provided much more than a stadium. As one St. Louis negotiator said
during discussions with the Rams, ""The Rams are asking for the moon, and we're going
to give them the moon. It's only a question of how big the moon is."42 The moon turned
15

out to be huge. In what was called by another NFL owner "the mother of all stadium
deals,'"
43
the Rams got 100 percent of the revenues from 120 high-priced "luxury suites"
and 6,200 "club seats"; a guarantee that 85 percent of the suites and club seats would be
sold; and 100 percent of concessions sales.
44
The city also agreed to let the team keep the
majority of the other stadium and convention center revenues, including 75 percent of all
advertising and "naming rights" monies,39 and paid $66 million to cover the team's debts
and expenses.
45
Cities like Houston, which appears on the verge of losing its football, and
possibly its baseball, team, might heed the advice of a principal in the effort to lure an
NFL team back to St. Louis: "It would have been cheaper to keep the team we had than to
go after another. That's clear. We hope that's a lesson from which other people can
benefit."
46
Baltimore, Maryland, could have used that advice to save millions of its own
dollars, when in 1984, it saw the Colts leave for Indianapolis after months of haggling
over a new or renovated stadium. As foreshadowed that year by Baltimore Evening Sun
columnist Bill Tanton:
You know what will happen ifwe lose the Colts? First there will be lawsuits filed and
all kinds of frantic action in the legislature, none of which will bring back the Colts.
Then there will be a drive to get 50,000 season ticket pledges for a new franchise.
Finally, there will be a campaign to build a new $100 million stadium. That would not
be ready five years, maybe ten. 47
Most of that prophecy came to pass, as the city even tried to keep the Colts in
town by claiming eminent domain over the team.48 Though it did not have a new stadium
with which to lure a team years later, Baltimore nevertheless fits into the "if you build it
..." list, since it made promises above even what St. Louis offered to regain an NFL team.
The former Cleveland Browns, soon to be the Baltimore Ravens, left town to play in a
100 percent taxpayer-funded, $175 million stadium, replete with club seats and 108
luxury suites. The team will pay no property taxes nor rent for the 30-year term of the
16

lease, and will keep all revenues from regular and premium seating, concessions, parking,
and advertising - for all events held in the stadium.
49
Also, taxpayers funded the physical
move from Cleveland and upgrades to the temporary stadium in Baltimore (while the new
one is being built). Local leaders, again, project a windfall ofjobs and economic impact,
but many wonder how any impact can balance the price paid when the team will only play
10 games a year in the new facility. Stadium proponents argue that, since the deal is
funded by proceeds from a special state lottery, the average taxpayer will not be affected,
though lottery proceeds, which were also used to fund the new Orioles baseball park, have
been less than expected so far.
49
The Orioles, incidentally, though content in their new
stadium, already want new lease terms based on the generous conditions of the Ravens'
agreement.
Ironically, Cleveland is about to join St. Louis and Baltimore as another city that
will pay as much or more for a new stadium (for a new team) than it was willing to for an
existing team. City and state funds will pay for most of the estimated $220 million cost
to build a new stadium for an, as yet, unspecified football team.
'
Other Efforts
The "ifyou build it ..." strategy appears to be a growing trend, as a host of other
cities have completed, are planning, or have proposed new arenas meant to attract a





Summary of "If You Build It ." Cities
LOCATION WHAT THEY WANT WHAT THEY'VE GOT
Nashville, TN (1) NFL team
Houston Oilers ?
(2) NBA or NHL team
Hartford Whalers ?
$80 million bond issue for $290 million stadium
approved by voters in May 1996 ~ bonds
backed by "bed" tax & water dept surplus32
$71 million raised from the sale of seat licenses45
team guaranteed $35 million stadium revs/year53
$120 million arena opening fall 1996 -- funded by
property tax increase
34
New Orleans, LA NBA team
minor league hockey
funding for $84 million arena approved in June --
4-cent "bed" tax already exists
53
sitework started; project out for bids this summer
Sacramento, CA MLB team city council approved in June 1996 mayor's plan
to build $200 million stadium downtown site
favored for economic impact; funding uncertain5
Memphis, TN NBA team $85 million Pyramid arena opened in 1991 -
operates with $500,000+ loss per year37
downtown revitalization never materialized
Oklahoma City, OK NBA or NHL team(s) 20,000-seat multi-purpose arena in design phase
voters in 1993 accepted 5 -year, 1-cent sales tax
increase to fund $285 million package of sports
& entertainment facilities ~ largest U.S. public





San Diego Padres ?
private ownership group has pledged $100 million
towards $300 million stadium; no site determine
regional state sales tax rejected by VA legislature ir
June 1996 - new lottery being discussed38
Anaheim, CA (1) NFL team
(2) NBA team
city unveiled plans in January 1996 for a sports anc
entertainment complex — no funding on line59
arena, which houses NHL's Ducks, expected to los<
$20 million in first 4 years60
hard to attract team since Disney (Ducks 1 owner)
and city get 70% of all arena revenues
Gary, IN Chicago Bears business leaders attempting to gain support for $50
million complex to include new football stadium
income or food & beverage tax discussed61
Columbus, OH Canadian Football
League team
$280 million arena and stadium projects proposed
by city and county officials in December 1995
funding to be state grants/loans, sales tax increases,
and private backing — vote in Nov. 9662
Manchester, NH minor league hockey mayor and city council in December 1995 adopted
plan for $43 million arena ~ 70/30 public /
private funding63
Raleigh, NC minor league hockey
or NHL team
considering $30 million upgrade to proposed arena
to add suites and premium seats in order to
land pro hockey; taxable bonds or private loans6
'
Osceola County, FL NFL's Tampa Bay
Buccaneers
city and county officials discussing funding for nev




THE IMPORTANCE OF SPORTS FACILITIES
Sports franchises may be valuable to communities, but the arenas they play in are
priceless to the teams. The Phoenix Suns, despite playing in the nation's 17th largest
media market, 3 rank second in the NBA in operating income66 thanks to the revenue they
draw from their America West Arena. The Detroit Tigers, who are attempting to secure
funding and a site for a new ballpark, estimate an immediate $40 million gain in annual
revenue if they get the new stadium. ' The facilities teams play in, not television fees or
the average fan's support, are the vehicles communities and especially team owners wish
to ride to greater economic prosperity. In 1991, Financial World magazine began
devoting most of an entire issue each year to the financial aspects of professional sports
franchises. As they summarized that year:
With big television contracts a thing of the past and with wage demands from players
continuing to escalate, the owners have desperately searched for other sources of
income. They think they have found them right under their noses in the form of luxury
suites, premium seating, advertising, and concessions. So they are building - and in
some cases, rebuilding - to create structures that will maximize cash flow from these
67
sources.
As evidenced by the ongoing rash of stadium renovation and construction
projects, teams have determined that the facility itself represents the key to garnering a
revenue stream large enough to enhance the team's worth, finance the kind of payroll
necessary to field a competitive team, maximize the pool of monies that are not shared
with other franchises, and defray the cost of obtaining the team in the first place.
Building Boom
Between 1964 and 1984, over $6 billion was spent to build or renovate baseball
and football stadiums in the U.S. 2 Over $1 billion was spent or committed just between
1992 and 1995 for all professional sports. 21 Marquette University's National Sports Law
Institute estimates that more than half of this country's professional franchises will have
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new or renovated facilities by the end of this decade, meaning the total for all four major
sports in the 1990s could reach $14 billion.46 14
The facility boom has been especially prevalent in hockey and basketball, where
teams often share the same arena, helping to ensure a steady flow of arena events (and
revenues). In the NHL, new arenas opened in Anaheim and San Jose in 1993/94; in
Chicago and St. Louis in 1994/95; and in Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa, and Boston in
1995/96. Others will open for the 1996/97 season in Tampa, Philadelphia, and Buffalo.
Ground is being broken or funding obtained for facilities in Washington, DC. and Miami.
Denver and Los Angeles are working on plans for a new arena. 69 Multi-million
renovations have upgraded many of the other NHL arenas in the last three years, including
those in Pittsburgh, Calgary, and Edmonton. In the NBA, 17 of the 29 teams play in
arenas built or renovated since 1988, and five more will do so in the next two to three
years.
The boom has not been quite as rampant in the higher cost (construction-wise)
sports of baseball and football, though five single-purpose baseball parks and three
football stadiums have opened have opened this decade. A flurry of construction took
place from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, as dual-purpose baseball / football
stadiums were erected in New York, San Francisco, Houston, Atlanta, St. Louis, San
Diego, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Anaheim. 70 Now, each of these facilities
either (1) retains only one of its two former occupants; (2) has one or both tenants about
to leave or looking for a new facility or new lease; or (3) both. Given this, the "stadium
envy" and revenue crunch many owners are feeling, and a trend toward single-purpose
parks, baseball and football figure to follow closely on the heels of their NHL and NBA
brethren with construction and renovation runs of their own.
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The current boom is not the result of structurally inadequate facilities or a lack of
seating capacity, as were the cases in previous booms. Rather, it stems from the teams'
need to maximize their intake of revenue. 14 The San Antonio Spurs, though playing in a
brand new facility (the AlamoDome opened in 1993) and among the NBA's leaders in
attendance, cite the need for more luxury suite revenues and "a more intimate
atmosphere" as reasons they are investigating a new, privately-financed arena. Atlanta's
Fulton County Stadium, which opened in 1966 and is still viable, was built to house both
the Braves and Falcons, but will be vacant before the mortgage is even paid off when the
Braves move into the new Olympic Stadium in 1997. 72 The same is true in south Florida,
where the NBA Miami Heat and NHL Florida Panthers are leaving the eight year old
Miami Arena in favor ofnew arenas that promise more revenue-gathering capability and
better leases. Dade County, while continuing to pay off $38 million in debt for Miami
Arena, recently approved a new $165 million arena for the Heat, 73 while the Panthers are
getting a new facility a few miles north in Broward County after claiming they lose at
least $1.2 million per month at Miami Arena due to a poor lease. 74 The eight-year old
Charlotte Coliseum, with $36 million of debt still on the note, is no longer adequate for
the NBA Hornets, who are exploring siting and funding options for a new facility. 75
Today's wave of arena construction and renovation projects is not confined to the
major league cities. A 1990 revision of facility standards, set forth by the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, made renovation or new construction a
requirement for almost all of this country's 200 minor league ballparks ~ the construction
of 10 new parks began in 1995 alone. Included in that group was the AAA team in
Indianapolis, which was told to renovate their deteriorated stadium, build a new one, or
risk losing the franchise; a new $18 million park will open in July 1996. 76 Fresno,
California, is considering $37 million in public and private financing for a new stadium
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and relocation fees to obtain a AAA minor league baseball team. The boom is even
prevalent in the smaller Florida and Arizona towns where baseball's spring training takes
place. Beginning in 1985, cities like Plant City, Port St. Lucie, Homestead, and Fort
Myers, Florida, spent from $5 million to $22 million to erect training complexes for
prospective teams.
31
The city of Tuscon, Arizona, is discussing a $44 million package of
construction and renovations for baseball facilities to house three teams' spring training.
78
Team Worth
The value of a pro sports team is directly proportional to its ability to generate
and keep stadium revenues. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the worth of professional
franchises, excepting hockey, was tied to the rapid growth of television revenues, with
NFL, NBA, and MLB teams gaining an annual compounded increase of 20 to 25 percent
in value over that period.
9
While still important, TV monies have now leveled off (except
in hockey) and are shared amongst all the league's teams, forcing teams to find alternative
means of remaining profitable — namely, the facilities they play in.
Recent sales, or near sales, of franchises illustrate the fact that a team's worth is
closely aligned with the present or future revenue-gathering capability of its stadium. The
Baltimore Orioles were sold in 1989 for $70 million; had a new, high revenue-producing
stadium with a great lease built for them by taxpayers in 1992; then were sold again in
1993 - this time for $173 million. 21 The Utah Jazz NBA franchise, valued at $45 million
in 1991 and playing in a low-revenue facility with a poor lease (from their viewpoint),
were offered as much as $100 million to relocate in the late 1980s. 9 They instead
financed a new, $86 million arena that generates close to $9 million in revenues, raising
their worth to $142 million in four years. 66 The new owner of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers
paid more than $190 million to buy, arguably, the worst team in all of professional sports.
That selling price was the most ever paid for a franchise and represented three and a half
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times the team's average yearly revenue intake.
79 Given that the team's existing stadium
lease expires in 2000, however, their potential to dramatically increase revenues (by
getting a new facility in Tampa or elsewhere) made the purchase price seem reasonable.
Cable television giant Comcast recently purchased a controlling interest in Philadelphia's
NHL Flyers and NBA 76ers, as well as their present and future arenas, for $430 million. 66
That figure is six times the teams' combined average revenues, but, again, is reflective of
the expected jump in revenues once the new Spectrum II opens in the fall of 1996, after
which the teams' values are projected to instantly increase as much as 20 percent. 80
Except for baseball, each sport's most valuable team is the one with the highest
stadium revenues. Even in baseball (with a few exceptions like the Yankees and Red
Sox, both of whom reap extraordinary local television revenues), the majority of the high-
value teams are revenue leaders, too. Financial World bases its annual tabulation of
teams' worth largely on arena revenues and the amount of control the teams have over
their facility (ownership of, lease agreement, etc.). Table 2, compiled from four issues of
that publication, shows the immediate impact that new, high revenue-producing stadiums
can have on the value of a professional franchise. In nearly every case, the new venue
produced substantial gains in revenues, which, in turn, inflated the value of the team by as
much as two or three hundred percent.
Sports' expansion teams perhaps best exemplify how the worth and profitability
of a franchise are tied to its ability to generate and keep stadium revenues, especially
when a new facility is included. The Jacksonville Jaguars, in their first year of NFL play
in 1995, made as much money from the sale of 10,000 "club seats" in their (essentially)
new facility as the Pittsburgh Steelers did by selling out all 59,600 seats in their stadium.46
The expansion Arizona Diamondbacks, who begin MLB play in 1998 in a new, $284
million, retractable-dome stadium, project first-year net revenues that would immediately
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make them the third most profitable team in baseball. 81 Financial World estimates that
the Carolina Panthers will become the NFL's fifth most valuable franchise after the first
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Salaries and Revenue Sharing
Maximizing stadium revenues helps field a more competitive team especially
in the NFL and NBA, where such revenues are not part of the leagues' revenue sharing
plan or salary cap provision (NFL payrolls, for example, cannot exceed 64 percent of a
team's combined TV fees, gate receipts, and merchandise sales). 83
Teams have just recently discovered the link between high stadium revenues,
profits, payroll, and competitiveness. In the 1980s, for example, NFL teams had near-
equivalent revenues since a greater percentage of those revenues were shared — lower
payrolls often meant higher profits. During that decade, the league's least successful (on
the field) franchise, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, reaped a cumulative operating profit of
$47 million, while the team with the best overall record, the San Francisco 49ers, lost $45
million, mostly due to the high payrolls that begat its success. The Dallas Cowboys
have mastered the modern approach of doing both by building more luxury suites and
cutting their own advertising deals to increase revenues, then using the proceeds to sign
high-priced talent. With more money available that does not count toward salaries, teams
like the Cowboys are better equipped to pay the players needed to contend for
championships, and since total revenues are so high, they have more money left over for
"operating income." For example, though they spend nearly $20 million more on
players,
66
the Cowboys have only 58 percent of their revenues allotted for salaries,
compared with the Cincinnati Bengals' 75 percent. 38 The key, of course, is playing in a
stadium that makes money. The president of baseball's San Francisco Giants, whose
repeated attempts to get public support for a new stadium were based on the need for
more revenues, linked the team's success to getting a new park: "It's no coincidence that
the Cleveland Indians won the American League pennant their second year in a new
stadium or that Toronto won two World Series after moving to a new stadium.'
26

Since television monies account for most of the shared revenues, and because
only 25 percent of baseball's total revenues come from TV (versus 64 percent in
football), MLB teams share only 36 percent of their proceeds with each other (versus 77
percent in the NFL). 83 This makes stadium revenue an even more crucial element to
baseball teams, and is proof that, unless all stadium revenues become shared, the gap
between the more and less valuable teams in that sport could widen.
The Cost of Ownership
Along with facility and player costs, the cost of acquiring a professional sports
team, new or existing, has substantially increased in the last 20 years, further explaining
the importance of drawing large stadium revenues.
Separate from the costs of building a stadium and acquiring players, prospective
owners of expansion teams pay for the right to join a league. The cost of doing so now
often exceeds what the team could hope to make during its first few years of existence.
The Seattle Seahawks and Tampa Bay Buccaneers paid the NFL a $16 million "franchise
fee" to join that league in 1976, but the Jacksonville and Carolina entries paid $140
million each to join in 1995. 84 The four expansion hockey teams that joined the NHL in
the 1990s each paid $50 million to do so. The Dallas Mavericks paid $8 million to join
the NBA in 1980; the Miami and Charlotte expansion teams each paid $32.5 million eight
years later.
85 While the Miami and Denver baseball teams paid $95 million to join MLB
in 1994,
9
the expansion Tampa Bay Devil Rays and Arizona Diamondbacks will pay
$130 million to join in 1998. 23 That figure, in fact, may reach $150 million when interest
payments and the withholding of television revenues are accounted for. 41
Over the past 1 5 years, buying an existing team quickly became a larger
proposition, too. An NBA team could be bought for $12.5 million in 1981 (as were the





The Detroit Red Wings sold for $8 million in 1982; the Hartford WhaleTs sold
two years later for $3 1 million. The principal owner of the Seahawks paid $8.2 million
in 1974 for a controlling interest, then sold the team in 1989 for $97 million. 9 The sale
price of the New York Mets increased between 1980 and 1986 from $20 million to $85
million.
86
Today's market fetches even more. The New England Patriots were bought in
late 1993 for $170 million. 87 The owner of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers paid a record
DO
$192 million to buy that franchise in 1995. Again, though, prospective owners do not






Stadium revenues are defined as the proceeds from skyboxes, concessions,
parking, and stadium advertising, and do not include gate receipts (the average fan's
ticket) or television broadcast fees. For the reasons outlined previously, these revenues












NFL 1992 53.3 2.1 3.9%
1994 61.8 5.4 8.7%
1995 68.6 6.2 9.0%
MLB 1992 60.9 8.8 14.4%
*1994 60.2 10.8 17.9%
*1995 50.4 10.2 20.2%
NBA 1991/92 37.0 4.4 11.9%
1993/94 46.6 5.3 11.4%
1994/95 52.0 6.0 11.5%
NHL 1991/92 26.1 2.3 8.8%
1993/94 31.4 5.1 16.2%
* 1994/95 28.0 5.3 18.9%
SOURCE: 5/25/93, 5/9/95, and 5/20/96 issues of Financial World magazine
* extrapolated data that assumes completion ofstrike-shortened season
These stadium revenues are generated by renting high-priced luxury suites;
charging seat-holders for the "right" to purchase tickets; using arena space or the facility
itself as an advertising medium; outfitting the stadium with state-of-the-art amenities; and
controlling or owning the venue so that most revenues stay with the team.
Luxury Suites
The common factor in almost every team move, threat to move, or demand for a
new facility is a lack of stadium revenue. The most lucrative and sought-after generators
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of that revenue are high-priced luxury suites. The main impetus for the Raiders' decision
to leave the revenue-poor Los Angeles Coliseum in 1995 and return to Oakland, for
example, was that city's promise to refurbish its stadium to provide 175 luxury suites.
Luxury suites, or skyboxes, are usually leased long-term (3 to 10 years) by
corporations or other businesses and used to entertain and woo clients or reward
employees. ' Attendance by the average fan, while always a good and desirable thing, has
taken a back seat in fiscal importance to these suites, as explained by the Lehman Brothers
executive who arranged financing for Chicago's new United Center arena: "The big
advantage of having a good skybox market is that attendance can really drop off and it
won't hurt your revenue stream because you have people on an annual lease."
67
Maximizing the number of regular seats, the preferred design criteria of old, is no longer a
must. A proposed new baseball stadium in Pittsburgh will seat only 35,000 fans (making
it the MLB's second smallest park), but should reap high revenues with an abundance of
suites.
89
Luxury suite proceeds are especially important in the NFL, where more than 60
percent of the gate receipts from the "normal" fan's tickets go toward salaries and other
teams under the league's revenue-sharing plan. 38
The astronomical sums ofmoney generated by these suites account for the
demand for new facilities and explain why team owners do not mind "overpaying" for
teams that, operating in suite-poor facilities, have not yet reached their revenue-producing
potential. The Ballpark at Arlington features 120 suites that lease for $50,000 to
$200,000 a year.90 The Seattle SuperSonics arena, renovated in 1995 for $94 million, has
58 suites that rent for $55,000 to $135,000 per year. 91 Boston's Celtics and Bruins share
the new Fleet Center, which features 104 suites renting for $13 1,000 to $2 1 1,000
annually.
1 The Tampa Bay Lightning's new arena will lease 72 suites for between
$55,000 and $100,000 per season. 1 Carolinas Stadium, new home to the NFL's Panthers,
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has 135 luxury boxes that rent for an average of $71,000 per season,68 even more
impressive when considering that the team plays only two pre-season and eight regular-
season games there (major league baseball teams have 8 1 regular-season home games;
basketball -41; hockey - 40). The new Spectrum II arena in Philadelphia will feature 126
suites, versus 16 in the original Spectrum,
80
explaining why the teams' new owners paid
what they did to acquire the teams and arena. The Redskins' new stadium will feature
280 suites. 38
Luxury suites have become an equalizing factor, for now, for smaller markets,
both in keeping an existing team satisfied and in enticing a new or relocated franchise. By
erecting new stadiums in 1992 and 1994 with scores of luxury suites, the Baltimore
Orioles and Texas Rangers earn more stadium revenue than any other major league
baseball teams, including those with greater attendance and in larger markets such as New
York, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco. 66 The Houston Oilers, though in the nation's
eleventh most populated metropolitan area and fourth largest television market, only
earned $4.4 million in stadium revenues during 1995. 66 Thanks to an abundance of
luxury suites in the planned stadium in Nashville, they have been guaranteed $35 million
in annual revenues for 10 years if they relocate to that city, one with a fraction of the
population, corporate base, and television market. 38
Luxury suites may not, however, be a permanent edge for smaller markets. The
New York Yankees, whose combination of good stadium revenues and incredible
television revenues makes them one of sports' most valuable teams, nevertheless want a
new facility when their lease expires in 2002, the cost of which is expected to top $1
billion.
3 A new park with plenty of skyboxes could increase their annual stadium
revenues to as much as $200 million, compared with 1995's $94 million. The equalizing
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effect that smaller-market teams covet, therefore, may one day evaporate when large-
market teams like the Yankees build new facilities of their own.
The revenues-through-suites theory could ultimately be undermined by supply
and demand, especially in cities that lack the corporate base to support a number of teams
and accompanying luxury boxes. The Georgia Dome in Atlanta, for example, was
originally proposed to be funded privately, but had to be "saved" by the state legislature
when advanced skybox sales were not enough to secure financing. Cleveland's Browns
left town, in part, because the luxury suite market was tapped out with new arenas for the
MLB Indians and NBA Cavaliers. 95 Seattle is debating the construction of a new baseball
park for the Mariners and renovations to the existing Kingdome for the NFL Seahawks.
These projects, combined, would double the number of area suites at a time when the
NBA Sonics' newly refurbished Key Arena only leased 50 of its 58 skyboxes. 14
Nashville's football stadium and guarantee to the Oilers have already impaired efforts to
find corporate backers of suites in another new facility, the $120 million, teamless arena
nearing completion.
54
With the addition of the Avalanche hockey team in 1995, Denver
became one of only 10 U.S. metropolitan areas to host teams in all four major sports. Just
based on population alone (2 1st largest in the country, according to the 1990 census), that
city's capability to corporately support these teams over a long period of time seems
questionable. The same could be said for Phoenix (19th largest metropolitan area), which
will also house all four sports when the baseball Diamondbacks begin play in 1998.
Financial analysts in Minneapolis have similar worries regarding a new baseball park for
the Twins, one that would add another 60 to 80 suites to that area's total.96
Seat Licenses
The hottest trend in user-pay revenue production is the use of "PSLs" - defined by
different communities as either Permanent, Premium, or Personal Seat Licenses. PSLs do
32

not include the cost of the actual tickets, but give fans the "right" to buy season tickets
over a period of usually one to ten years.
• The new Carolinas Stadium, home of the NFL Panthers, was funded in large
measure by the 65,000 PSLs fans bought for $700 to $3,000 each. 97
• The NBA's Golden State Warriors are partially financing a $90 million arena
renovation project by selling the rights to 7,750 lower-level seats at an average
cost of $2,500 each.98
• $75 million in PSLs were sold in St. Louis to help fund a practice facility for,
and pay the debt and relocation costs of, the Rams football franchise. 46
• The Baltimore Ravens, formerly the Cleveland Browns, sold 53,000 of 57,000
$100 PSLs as of July 1996 to help fund their new stadium.99
• PSLs will be a chief source of funding for the new football stadium in
Cleveland.
100
• Nashville's $292 million football stadium will be funded, in part, by $71.5
million worth of PSLs. 101
• Fans of the NBA Toronto Raptors have purchased $30 million worth of seat
licenses for the team's new arena, set to open in 1997. 8
Seat licenses, though, may not be appropriate in towns that already have a team or




In Cincinnati, where new stadiums for both the
Reds and Bengals appear to be on line, the idea of using PSLs to help fund construction
was nixed by a city report studying the matter: "While that approach might succeed in
areas gaining new sports franchises, fans in existing major league cities such as Cincinnati





Stadium Advertising and Corporate Sponsorship
Non-team professional sports, like golf and tennis, have relied for years on
corporate sponsorship to fund the prize money for their tours. 103 The major team sports
have begun to expand that philosophy by using corporate dollars, paid to advertise in the
arena or re-name it, to increase their total pot of revenues or make facility improvements.
The Chicago White Sox gained an additional $ 1 million in annual revenues when
they began selling advertising space behind home plate in 1995, joining a growing list of
MLB teams who do likewise. 1 The NHL's Dallas Stars recently began renting out
rotating advertisement signs in the "dasher boards" that surround the team's ice rink.
1
More than 100 money-making advertising signs are plastered inside Joe Robbie
Stadium. 106 The NFL Cowboys reached a $40 million agreement with Pepsi to make it
the "official cola of Texas Stadium," despite the fact the NFL has its own agreement with
Coca-Cola. ' They also draw revenue from "exclusive stadium tie-ins" with Nike,
American Express, and other companies.46
"Naming rights" are the fastest-growing trend in the quest to maximize stadium
revenues. Erie County, New York, was ahead of its time in 1973 when it sold the naming
rights to the Buffalo Bills' stadium to the Rich Products Corporation for $1.5 million over
25 years,
43
but that kind of money is laughable now. Also, the revenues for such rights
usually go to the team today, no matter what monies funded the stadium. Whether the
facility is new or existing, airlines, banks, breweries, and other companies are paying
millions to attach their names to the popular sports establishment.
• Trans World Airlines sponsors the new domed football stadium in St. Louis
for $ 1 .3 million a year.
• Pacific Telesis agreed in April 1996 to pay $50 million toward a new San
Francisco Giants ballpark to be named Pacific Bell Park. 66
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• Miller Brewing Company will pay $4 1 million to have their name on a new
Milwaukee Brewers stadium. 107
• Continental Airlines will pay $26 million over 12 years as consideration for
changing the name of the New Jersey Nets' and Devils' arena from the
Brendan Byrne Arena to the Continental Airlines Arena. 108
• The expansion Arizona Diamondbacks baseball team, set to begin play in
1998 in a new ballpark, will keep two-thirds of a 30-year, $1 million per year
stadium "naming rights" deal with Bank One. 109
• Pepsi agreed to pay $68 million for the exclusive concession rights and





• The 3Com computer company underwrote $35 million worth of
improvements to the former Candlestick Park in San Francisco in exchange for
re-naming the facility 3Com Park. l
• Air Canada will pay $ 1 5 million to name the Toronto Raptors' new arena, plus
another $1.5 million a year for 20 years for "promotional rights."8
Financial World magazine predicts that every pro stadium will be named after a
corporation by the year 2000,66 as teams rush to match the revenue leaders in their sports
by increasing total income and financing new venues. Other examples of other
corporately-named arenas include: 112
United Center (Chicago Bulls and Blackhawks)
USAir Arena (Washington Bullets & Capitals)
[soon to be replaced by the new MCI Center]
Fleet Center (Boston Celtics & Bruins)
Target Center (Minnesota Timberwolves)
Key Arena (Seattle SuperSonics)
ARCO Arena (Sacramento Kings)
Busch Stadium (St. Louis Cardinals)
Delta Center (Utah Jazz)
America West Arena (Phoenix Suns and relocated NHL team)
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Arrowhead Pond (Anaheim Ducks)
Coors Field (Colorado Rockies)
RCA Dome (Indianapolis Colts)
Great Western Forum (Los Angeles Lakers & Kings)
Canadian Airlines Saddledome (Calgary Flames)
Facility Amenities
Augmenting the luxury suites, PSLs, and corporate tie-ins are a host of stadium
extras that further elevate the cost of outfitting a modern-day sports facility. Stadiums
and arenas today are expected to be much more than a simple venue for observing athletic
contests, both to appease fans and to generate still more revenues.
In St. Petersburg, where an additional $48 million is being spent to ready the
ThunderDome for baseball, the list of improvements is meant to bring that facility up to
the standard set by parks that have opened since the ThunderDome was finished in 1990.
Cites the St. Petersburg Times: "A grass diamond and a hot dog stand no longer will do.
Today's stadiums ... are entertainment experiences with memorabilia museums, fancy
restaurants, gift shops, and giant scoreboards.' The Texas Rangers new facility, the
Ballpark in Arlington, for example, includes a "Legends of the Game" museum, a "sports
art" gallery, six gift shops, and a restaurant with full views of the field. The complex as a
whole also includes a youth baseball park and an amphitheater, and parts of the stadium
are open whether a game is being played or not.41 The new, retractable-roof baseball
stadium being built in Phoenix for the Arizona Diamondbacks expansion team will
feature a 10,500 square foot, youth-oriented, interactive theme park; two sports bars and
at least two restaurants; a "timeline" of baseball history circling the main concourse; a
"Hall of Fame" showcasing the team's history; a large video-playback screen in
centerfield and 350 television sets scattered throughout the park; and a "Kids Corner"
facility that will allow restless children to "try on uniforms, play on equipment, have their
picture taken with cardboard figures of players, and buy concessions" while parents watch
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the ongoing game via television sets." 3 The Carolina Panthers' new stadium features
amenities for the fans, like double the number of concession stands found in most other
stadiums, but also addressed the comfort of players by including a 45-yard-long dressing
room and a 9,000 square foot weight room. Chicago's United Center includes
"Fandemonium," a 5,000 square foot novelty store with a 70-seat theater and a Bulls and
Blackhawks "Hall of Fame."
114 The Dallas Cowboys are discussing the addition of a
theme park and museum next to their stadium that would include "virtual reality exhibits
allowing fans to simulate playing professional football themselves." The San Francisco
Giants' new park will include seats with a credit card "swiper" that allows fans to order
deliverable snacks, seat-back TV screens, and plug-in audio jacks. 14
The trend is almost as rampant in minor league baseball facilities, where an
attempt is made to balance the lower level of play with the facility itself. Like their major
league counterparts, these minor league franchises are maximizing revenues with luxury
suites and premium seating, but are also manufacturing a "one-stop-shopping"
entertainment vehicle with their new or refurbished stadiums. Lake Elsinore, California,
recently completed a $12 million baseball park funded by a mix of public and private
monies. Providing a total entertainment package was the chief design goal, as explained
by a member of the project's development group: "Most of the fans coming out to watch
minor league baseball are really coming out to be entertained. They want to have fun,
have a safe place to bring their family at an affordable price - the baseball is somewhat
secondary." 115
Control of Facility / Corporate Ownership
The conditions under which a team uses their stadium are keys to both its worth
and ability to keep more revenues. The Dallas Cowboys were sold for $135 million in
1989,
83
but are now worth more than $270 million, 66 thanks largely to the fact that their
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stadium and practice facilities are team-owned and debt-free. The Orioles began play in
their new ballpark in 1992 under an agreement with the city of Baltimore generous
enough that, when the team was auctioned off in 1993, the lease itself was cited as the
team's biggest asset.
Ideally, as far as the teams are concerned, a new, high-revenue producing facility,
funded by taxpayers, also comes gift-wTapped with a lease that niinrmizes franchise risk
and turns most of the money back over to the team, as with the Orioles. Such is also the
case in St. Louis with the Rams; soon, in Baltimore (again) with the Ravens; and in
Chicago, where the White Sox agreed to have their new park built in the same
neighborhood as the old stadium once the city deducted $60 million from their lease and
promised that no rent would be due if attendance was less than 1 .2 million in a season. 12
The Jacksonville Jaguars keep the revenues produced by all concessions, advertising, and
luxury suites in their city-owned stadium. 1 The Miami Heat will keep 100 percent of the
stadium revenues in its soon-to-be-built arena. 116
Short of such best-case scenarios, teams still attempt to control their venue with
agreements that allow them to keep a larger share of the revenues. The NHL's Edmonton
Oilers, for example, recently improved their standing by signing a new, 40-year lease that
allows them to keep revenues from all events, not just their games, held in the Edmonton
Coliseum.
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The Denver Broncos, who have played before sellout crowds for years,
nevertheless retain relatively little of the earned revenues because of their lease. Though
apparently not a threat to leave, they would like to take control of Mile High Stadium "so
they can have a free hand to follow the Dallas example." 105 The company that owns the
Denver Nuggets (NBA) and Colorado Avalanche (NHL) reached an agreement in 1994
with the city of Denver to build a $150 million arena for the two teams that included
deeding the new facility's title to the city. Now, however, the company wants to retain
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the title "in order to finance the project and show the arena as an asset to lenders." The
Detroit Lions have proposed assuming the remaining $30 million in debt for their
stadium, built in 1975, in return for being allowed to keep all of the stadium revenue,
none of which they currently receive. 1 18 Other NFL teams, like the afore-mentioned
Colts, plus those in Minneapolis, Boston, Denver, San Francisco, and Philadelphia are
attempting to (at least) negotiate new leases that would allow them more control and,
therefore, more revenues.
38 The dilemma for the cities they will negotiate with is the
ever-rising standard being established by other teams and cities. The owner of the
Buffalo Bills admitted as much when discussing his team's lease, which expires after the
1997 season: "We want to see what's going to transpire in the next two or three years on
other stadium situations before we enter into any new lease."
119
While baseball and football teams now want single-purpose stadiums, basketball
and hockey teams seem comfortable sharing venues. This helps maximize arena
profitability by keeping the facility in use more often, and is enhanced further when a
single, often corporate, owner controls both teams and the shared facility - a growing
trend in the 1990s.
68
Historically, professional sports teams were owned by families or by one or a
small group of wealthy entrepreneurs. With stadium revenues now such a desired
commodity, however, corporate team ownership is on the rise, given the large amount of
capital needed to run a team and finance a new or refurbished arena. Chicago's Cubs are
owned by the Tribune Company. The San Antonio Spurs are owned by 2 1 businesses
and individuals. 71 The new Arizona MLB team will be owned by seven corporations and
three individuals.
23
Corporate ownership of a team does not often provide a reasonable return on the
investment, however, unless the arena itself is controlled. 9 The corporate franchise owner
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minimizes risk and maximizes revenues by also owning the facility its teams play in.
Beer brewer Molson, for example, which owns the Montreal Canadians hockey team,
sunk $ 1 70 million into land and construction costs for a new arena for that team. The
NBA Raptors' ownership group is financing a $200 million arena and office complex for
that team in Toronto.
8
The corporate owner completely covers itself by owning two teams and the arena,
as with the afore-mentioned cases in Philadelphia and Denver, thereby providing more
facility events and creating corporate "'synergy."66 Cablevision Systems and ITT jointly
own the New York Knicks and Rangers, along with Madison Square Garden and its cable
TV network,4 allowing for total control of all financial aspects associated with team and
arena operations, and, as noted by ill's chief financial officer, "better economies of
scale."
68
Arenas that feature two teams also have a better chance of leasing all of their
luxury suites, since suite holders usually get tickets to all public events in the arena, as is
the case with Madison Square Garden. A large Canadian entertainment and retail
corporation. Oca Bay, owns the Vancouver NHL (Canucks) and NBA (Grizzlies) teams
and the new, $163 million arena they share - the first privately-funded sports arena in
Canada since 1934. 121 The owner of the Washington Bullets and Capitals is building a
new arena for both teams. 66 The Walt Disney Company owns the NHL Anaheim Ducks
(plus a controlling interest in the Anaheim-based Angels baseball team), and is said to be
considering buys of the Ducks' new arena and the Los Angeles Clippers NBA franchise. 66
Such a move would allow Disney to move the Clippers to Anaheim and maximize the use
and revenue intake of its own arena The shared arena concept can work even if
corporations are not involved, as in Chicago, where the NBA Bulls and NHL Blackhawks
are owned by separate individuals, each ofwhom owns half of the new arena that both





Given the broad range of prices, local politics, and team ownership, there is no
"modeF financing package for building or renovating sports facilities. 122 Some have
contended that smaller markets, with fewer fans and a smaller corporate base, are
especially apt to need subsidization, 123 but public monies still foot most of the bill for
projects in cities of all sizes, 14 despite the fact that the general public does not generally
support such public subsidies. A national poll conducted recently by Media Research and
Communications found that "80 percent of Americans oppose the use of their tax dollars
for sports stadiums and arenas." 124 Perhaps the voices of opposition are less organized; 125
maybe minds change when it comes to a vote; stadiums are sometimes lumped in with
other projects whose funding is likely to be approved; often, the matter is never even
brought to a vote. Whatever the case, the public's money is always at least somewhat
involved in the construction of sports venues, even those financed wholly by the team
itself.
The use of team money, from wealthy owners, expected stadium revenues, or
private loans, has become more widespread, though. Corporate ownership, particularly in
hockey and basketball, is on the rise, as owners seek sources of capital that are less
politically contentious than public funds.
As with a city's economic development, where the only proven success is a plan
that includes pro sports as (just ) a portion of a larger effort, the funding arrangements that




Taxpayers in the U.S. subsidized more than $1 billion worth of stadium
construction and renovation projects from 1993 to 1996. 126 Examining major league
baseball alone reveals the weight public funds usually bear for new facilities:
• Baseball's five newest stadiums were all funded predominantly with public
monies: Comiskey Park, Chicago (87 percent); Camden Yards, Baltimore (80
percent); Jacobs Field, Cleveland (84 percent); the Ballpark in Arlington (71
percent); and Coors Field, Denver (86 percent). 127
41
• The entire cost of the new baseball park in Phoenix will be funded by
taxpayers.
109
• State and county monies will pay for $275 million of the estimated $320
million cost to build the Seattle Mariners a new stadium.
128
• A Virginia-based group of investors who want to establish major league
baseball in that state proposed to pay a third of the $300 million cost of
building a stadium if the state financed the remainder. 129
The pattern should continue when the football stadium boom begins, as they will
demand the greatest public subsidy of the four major sports53 because (1) their stadiums
are usually the largest and most expensive; (2) their annual stadium revenues are lower, on
average, since they host only 10 home games a year (versus baseball teams' 81 home
games); and (3) they will less frequently share tenancy, like NHL and NBA teams often
do, because of the recent push for single-purpose baseball facilities. 82 The new Trans
World Dome and adjacent convention center in St. Louis, for example, will cost taxpayers
$720 million oveT the next 30 years.46
Sales tax increases are perhaps the most common form of taxation for stadiums.
The monies gathered can be great, and proponents argue that the minuscule amount of the
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hike (usually a fraction of a percent) does no harm to the average citizen. A five-county,
"special" sales tax was approved by the Wisconsin legislature to cover $160 million of the
estimated $250 million cost of building the Milwaukee Brewers a new ballpark. 130 A six-
county sales tax increase funded $161 million of the $215 million cost of building Coors
Field in Denver for the Rockies baseball team. 41 Hamilton County, Ohio, voters recently
approved a half-cent sales tax increase to help fund the $540 million construction of
separate new stadiums for Cincinnati's Reds and Bengals. 66 San Antonio's Alamodome
was funded mostly by a voter-approved, half-cent sales tax increase. 131 A sales tax
increase will provide $238 million to build the Arizona Diamondbacks' $300 million
ballpark.
14
Taxes aimed at specific industries, usually tourism-related, are an oft-used means
of raising money without incurring the political wrath of the average taxpayer. Hotel and
motel surcharges, nicknamed "bed" taxes, are promoted as a way to raise money from
tourist visitors, not local citizens. New Orleans, which has had a four percent bed tax in
place for over 20 years, used proceeds from that tax to pay off the bonds that built the
Superdome. Now the tax, which raises roughly $22 million annually, is being used to
finance, among other projects, a new, $84 million multi-purpose arena meant to attract
professional hockey or basketball. 55 Bed taxes funded the majority of the Chicago White
Sox' $137 million stadium that opened in 1991.41 Atlanta increased its existing bed tax to
help fund the Georgia Dome. 67 Bed taxes in Pinellas County, Florida, will help pay for
$50 million worth ofThunderDome upgrades to ready that facility for baseball. 41 The
Florida Panthers' new, $176 million arena in Broward County is being funded by a two
percent bed tax. 133 Existing bed taxes in Nashville, along with a surplus in water
department funds, back the $80 million worth of bonds that city will issue to help fund a
new football stadium.
52
Orlando used a hotel/motel tax to finance half of the cost of its
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$100 million home for the NBA Magic. 131 A proposal to build a $415 million domed
stadium for the Chicago Bears relies on $185 million from restaurant and bed taxes. 14
Rental car and bar / restaurant taxes will supply most of the $275 million worth of public
funding for the Seattle MarineTs
,
new stadium. Tourist taxes will provide the bulk of
financing for the Miami Heat's new arena. 73
Such taxes often face more organized opposition, however, than do sales taxes.
The state of Florida rejected a plan to tax rental cars in Hillsborough County to help fund
a new stadium for the Buccaneers
134
after intense anti-tax lobbying by the rental car
companies. Debate continues in Minnesota, where the MLB Twins want a new stadium,
over the type of tax that might be used to fund the project. Hospitality and tourist
councils are rallying against bed and "sin" (liquor or cigarette sales) taxes, charging
instead that a metro-wide sales tax would be better since it would "not pass this off to one
industry."
135
Statewide measure are often even more politically delicate than local ones. States
that fund one city's sports projects set a precedent that may result in a continuing cry for
like assistance, as in the state of Ohio. After chipping in for Cleveland's Gateway Project,
that state will contribute 15 percent of the estimated $545 million for new arenas in
Cincinnati for the Reds and Bengals. 136 The state is also to committed to 15 percent of
the cost to build a new football stadium in Cleveland. 126 In June of 1996, a Pittsburgh
mayoral task force laid out plans for a new, $200 million baseball stadium that called for
at least half of the funds to come from the state of Pennsylvania, citing a greater need than
Philadelphia for state help due to Pittsburgh's smaller size and corporate base. 89 The state
of Florida upped the ante by deciding in 1992 to grant a $2 million annual sales tax
exemption to stadiums that attract a new professional franchise. 137
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Stadium funding proposals are often tied to promises of "no new taxes." Even
so, critics argue, money is often diverted from other public projects like schools and
roads. Such is the case in Nashville, where leaders proclaim their new football stadium is
being built without increased taxes (the state's $70 million contribution comes from team
merchandise taxes; the city's from water department funds), but opponents fear a
reduction of funds available for other needs.
3
City property owners there are already
committed to increased property taxes to fund a $ 1 20 million arena that also has no
professional team.
54 A $235 million baseball stadium for the Detroit Tigers was approved
by voters with the stipulation that "no new taxes would be associated with the
construction, infrastructure, and land assembly." 138 The $95 million public contribution
includes a $55 million grant from the state's economic development-based "Michigan
Strategic Fund" and $40 million in city Downtown Development Authority bonds. 139 At
the same time, the city's NFL team, the Lions, are unhappy with the terms of their lease in
the suburban Pontiac Silverdome, and are floating the idea of renovations or a new
stadium backed partially by new bed and/or rental car taxes. 140 A recently-popular,
though risky, way of technically not introducing new taxes is the use of tax-increment
financing (TTF), which "involves taxing businesses that directly benefit from new
construction."
141
In this way, funds generated by the project itself are used to raise
money.
142 The corporate owner of the Denver NBA and NHL teams is discussing such
financing as a way to use public funds to help build a new arena while still meeting the
city mayor's demand that no new or increased taxes be levied. 142 The San Francisco
Giants' new park will be backed partially by TIF funding,95 as was the land purchase for
Minneapolis' Target Center. 143 The practice is speculative, however, since debts are
serviced by revenues that may or may not come to pass, depending on the amount of
economic development around the stadium. 31
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Other no-tax ways of funding arenas have been proposed but not implemented.
Ideas to partially finance new stadiums with city employee pension funds were suggested
and defeated in Cincinnati in 1995 and San Francisco in 1992.
104 144
Indian tribes in
Wisconsin offered to contribute millions to a new Brewers baseball stadium if the state
would approve their plan to open a gambling casino. 145 Previously, Wisconsin voters
defeated a plan to create a sports lottery, like the one in Maryland that funded the Orioles'
stadium, to help finance the Brewers' park.
145 A lottery was also rejected in Washington
state as a way to build a new Seattle baseball stadium. 128
Sports facility projects are often a part of a package that require voters to make an
all-or-nothing vote, as with the economic revitalization plans in Oklahoma City, Denver,
and Indianapolis. The sales tax increase referendum scheduled for September 1996 in
Tampa would fund new schools and other public works projects along with a new stadium
for the Buccaneers.
146
Funds to build the stadium would account for only 1 1 percent of
the total proceeds from the tax increase. 147
Then again, sports facility projects are frequently not presented to voters for a
choice at all. In many states, such as Texas, referendums are not required unless the funds
to pay for a new stadium originate from property tax-backed "general obligation"
bonds.
14
Communities in such states who propose to issue "revenue bonds," which are
backed by other taxes such as those on hotels/motels, rental cars, or event tickets, are not
legally bound to conduct elections on the proposal 148 and, often, do not. Some
governments have even held referenda that failed, then went ahead and funded the project
anyway. In Seattle, for example, a month after voters barely rejected a September 1995
proposal to raise taxes to renovate the Kingdome and build a new baseball park, public
funding for 86 percent of the $320 million baseball field was nevertheless approved by
the state legislature.
124 149 The funding plan endorsed by the King County Council will
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derive revenues from a combination of taxes on retail sales, rental cars, and restaurant
sales.
150
Voters have occasionally taken action against such happenings. A city
councilman in Phoenix lost his bid for re-election due, in part, to his leadership role in
getting public financing for the Diamondbacks' new stadium. 122 Former Oakland mayor
Lionel Wilson was not re-elected because of his plan to lure the Raiders back from Los
Angeles - one that included the city guaranteeing a sellout at every game by purchasing all
of the tickets and re-selling them. 25 State legislator George Petak became the first
Wisconsin lawmaker to be thrown out of office in a recall vote when he changed his mind
at the last minute and voted for the sales tax increase to help fund the new stadium for the
Brewers.
151
The agreement between state and team, incidentally, which called for the
Brewers to fund $90 million of the $250 million project, appeared dissolved until the
Brewers were granted a low-interest, $20 million loan from a local philanthropic
foundation.
152
The whole idea of funding stadiums with public money of any sort has come
under fire more than ever, as voters and politicians have grown weary of the ever-
increasing demands of pro sports teams. A county commissioner in Houston, who has
seen public funds build and improve the Astrodome, reacted to the Oilers' and Astros'
threats to leave: "How much public money is enough for them? Ifwe put more money
into the trough to make the sports owners and players richer, how long will it be before
they come back to us and ask for more money in that trough?" 153 Allen Sanderson, a
University of Chicago economics professor who studies professional sports, calls public
funding of stadiums "a reverse Robin Hood effect," where average taxpayers subsidize
wealthy team owners, players, and fans (those who can afford premium seats or luxury
suites). Luxury suites, in fact, are a primary item of contention with opponents of
publicly-funded sports venues. Critics contend that teams line their owners' pockets by
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getting the tax-paying public to pay for the construction or expansion of these suites.
Owners argue that luxury suites help underwrite the average fan by keeping ticket prices
down.
In the end, whether voted on or not, the exorbitant cost of the modern-day sports
facility usually necessitates a wide, and often complex, mix of funding sources. Such was
the case with Cleveland's $430 million Gateway Project. Completed m 1994 and
designed to "'bring people downtown and keep them there," it included a $161 million,
42,000-seat baseball park; a $1 18 million, 21,000-seat basketball arena; a five-story
administration building; and underground pedestrian walkways and utility tunnels. 154
Funding sources included:20
• a 15 -year, $180 million "'sin" tax on purchases of beer, wine, liquor, and
cigarettes, approved by voters by only a 1.2 percent margin
• $25 million from the state of Ohio
• a $120 million loan from Cuyahoga County
• advanced rentals of luxury suites at the baseball facility, Jacobs Field, that
raised roughly $20 million
• $28 million from naming rights for both Jacobs Field and the basketball
facility, Gund Arena
• a $28 million loan from 50 local companies that is not due to be paid back, if
ever, until 2023
• annual rent from the teams: $2.95 million from the Indians and $4.2 million
from the Cavaliers
Private Financing
Team contributions toward construction costs are usually derived from the very
aspects that were the impetus for wanting the new facility: luxury suites and other
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premium seats, advertising, parking, and concession revenues. During the first year of
play in their new ballpark, for example, the Texas Rangers turned over 1 00 percent of the
revenues from 122 luxury suites to the city of Arlington to help pay construction cost
debt.
68
Projects that are funded wholly or mostly by the team, however, require larger
sources of capital. "Private placement debt" through institutional investors and traditional
corporate bank loans have recently become more oft-used means of financing stadium
renovation or construction projects. In addition to pleasing taxpayers and other critics of
publicly-funded sports venues, private financing usually results in fewer cost overruns
because of the more restrictive demands of private lenders. 80 Private placement funding is
longer term (20 to 25 years), but typically includes stiff pre-payment penalties and a
higher and fixed yield (interest rate) since the stadium or arena is not a "proven entity"
with a corresponding credit rating.
155
Traditional loans, though shorter term (10 years
maximum), can be re-financed and are often easier to obtain since banks are more
accustomed to construction risk. 155
The owner of Washington's Bullets (NBA) and Capitals (NHL) is borrowing
most of the money needed to build a new, $175 million arena for those teams. 66
Philadelphia's $226 million Spectrum II arena is financed by $186 million in private
placement debt.
80 The private placement market will be used to fund the Golden State
Warriors' $130 arena renovation project, as it was for new stadiums for other NBA teams
in Toronto, Utah, Vancouver, and Boston. 156 The Tampa Bay Lightning borrowed to
fund approximately one-third of the cost of their new, $154 million "Ice Palace." 157 The
NHL Buffalo Sabres and MLB's San Francisco Giants and Detroit Tigers are using
private financing to fund the majority of their new stadiums. 158
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The NFL Carolina Panthers' stadium is generally regarded as the ideal example of
a privately-funded sports venue, in that it was built for $185 million without any taxpayer
monies, features amenities to please both players and fans, and has the high revenue-
producing capability (137 luxury suites) demanded by team owners. Sales of PSLs
raised more than $100 million and team owners fronted $60 million. 33 Another "model"
sports venue is the year-old, multi-purpose facility in Portland, Oregon, part of a 38-acre,
$262 million re-development plan. 150 Cited the Seattle Times upon that arena's opening:
This city's new Rose Garden Arena ... was financed without owner threats, ballot
measures, special legislative sessions, or predominantly public funding. What the ...
complex has had going for it is a clear need, a rabid fan base, and the deep pockets of
Seattle software billionaire Paul Allen, owner of the Portland Trail Blazers NBA team.
Of the arena's $262 million pricetag, just $34.5 million came from a public jurisdiction
- in this case, the city. Officials hope to recoup the money within six years through a 6
percent ticket tax and parking and rent revenue. The remaining was all private: $46
million from Paul Allen, a $16 million Bank of America- Seafirst Bank loan, $10 million
in interest and the biggest chunk, $155 million, from long-term mortgage notes
handled by Prudential Securities. 159
Such ventures frequently still require public support in the form of land or
infrastructure improvements, as with Miami's privately-financed Joe Robbie Stadium. 160
In Portland, the Trail Blazers' actual arena was funded privately, but city monies were




Washington Redskins are building their own $170 million stadium in Maryland, but are
being provided with $70 million worth of state-funded infrastructure upgrades. 161 Even
the Carolina Panthers' stadium had some public funds linked to its construction, as the
land it occupies was purchased, then "donated," by the city of Charlotte. 97
Private debt will probably remain a last resort, though, because of its higher cost,
the team owner's risk, and the likelihood that much of the sought-after stadium revenue
will be withheld until the debt is retired. The Lightning's revenue from 64 luxury suites,
for example, is being used as collateral until their $50 million construction loan is
repaid.
5
Baseball's Giants tried to get public funding for a new stadium for years (four
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times just since 1987) before finally developing a plan to do so privately. If ultimately
successful, they would be the first MLB team to privately finance a new ballpark since
1962, when Dodger Stadium was built. 162 The Giants' risk is high, however, since its
ability to handle $140 million in debt is based on drawing a million more fans per year
(for 20 years) than it currently does. 14 Long-term funding for high-risk ventures (like
professional sports) is also difficult to obtain from an investment community that is,
traditionally, both conservative and skeptical. The Trail Blazers' ability to secure private
placement financing was assuredly helped by the backing of team owner Paul Allen, a
majority stockholder in the Microsoft Corporation whose personal wealth ranks him as the
nation's fourth-richest individual.
159
Private financing is also more expensive, of course,
since tax-exempt bonds can not be used in such ventures.
Even privately funded stadiums can become burdensome to the public, as did the
Target Center in Minneapolis, home to the NBA Timberwolves. It was built with private
money, but taken over by city and state governments in a public buyout in order to retain
the team when its owners threatened to sell in order to recoup over $25 million in losses
suffered during the arena's first four years. 163 There is still $75 million of outstanding
debt on the building.
164
Project Delivery System
The entire package of design and construction contracting, project financing, and
facility lease agreement for large projects like a stadium is usually referred to as the
"project delivery system." 165 The arena projects that seem to most closely approximate a
"win/win" product for both team and government are those that place responsibility on
both parties in the concept and execution of the project delivery system.
The agreement that the Florida Panthers NHL team and Broward County struck to
build a new arena, for example, includes the following provisions: 166 The county must
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maintain the facility "to the same standard as an average of five of its newest counterparts
across the country," including new arenas in Buffalo, Anaheim, and Philadelphia, but
receives the first $2.8 million in net arena revenues to help pay the construction debt. The
county is funding the construction of the arena, but the Panthers are responsible for all
construction costs beyond the projected cost of $176 million.
The former Gator Bowl in Jacksonville, Florida, now the Jacksonville Municipal
Stadium, was essentially rebuilt under an agreement between the expansion Jaguars and
the city which stipulated that the city would pay for approximately $30 million worth of
infrastructure improvements and provide a maximum of $120 million toward the stadium
renovation (later raised to $128.5 million), while the team assumed responsibility for
construction management and any cost overruns. 16 This allowed for a quicker timeline
by avoiding the city's more cumbersome contracting and procurement rules, and provided
a financial dis-incentive for the team to make costly changes or additions to the planned
construction.
A multi-purpose domed sports and entertainment facility, the Globe Arena, was
the centerpiece of a $333 million downtown development project in the late 1980s in
Stockholm, Sweden, that featured a unique project delivery system. 167 A private
consortium of contractors, real estate firms, and insurance companies designed and
financed the entire development, which included a new hotel, shopping center, and 1.25
million square feet ofnew office space. The city donated all of the land (50 acres);
provided the consortium with a $63 million, interest-free loan with no payments due for
three years; promised to reimburse the consortium for any shortfalls in projected office
rentals; and promised to not permit any other developments in the area for three years. In
return, the city was given ownership of the Globe Arena and a fiscal guarantee that it
would be finished in time for the world hockey championship the city was due to host: the
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"liquidated damages" clause in the construction called for $166,000 in penalties for each
week after the estimated completion date the arena opening was delayed.
More public / private efforts that call on both parties to bear responsibility are
cropping up. The NBA Miami Heat, who, like the NHL Panthers, are unsatisfied in
Miami Arena, will bear a fiscal responsibility that requires them to cover any shortfalls in
expected tax revenues in their deal with Dade County for a new arena. 166 Public funds
will provide $200 million to build a new arena and supporting infrastructure in Atlanta for
the NBA Hawks, but all arena proceeds will go toward the $135 million construction cost,
and the team will cover any revenue or tax shortfalls. 168
A thoughtful project delivery system may have helped in the case of Toronto's
Skydome or in Cleveland, where taxpayer costs for the Gateway Project were $100
million more than originally estimated.
80
The Skydome, home of the MLB Blue Jays,
opened in 1989 and cost Ontario province taxpayers $322 million -- $275 million more
than projected. 80 During the inception of the project, a consortium of private investors
contributed $120 million for a 49% share of ownership of the facility. As minority
owners, the consortium was not responsible for construction cost overruns, but
nevertheless was given 12 of the 15 seats on the project's governing board. 169 That board
was the body responsible for project add-ons - a retractable roof, Hard Rock Cafe, the
largest McDonald's in North America, 365-room hotel, health club, and -'lavish" offices -
that increased building costs from $167 million to almost $500 million, the difference of
which taxpayers funded. 169
Though a popular and architectural success, Skydome was an immediate financial
disaster for the province. With more than half of the construction cost financed with debt,
interest payments alone totaled more than $26 million a year. 67 In the third year of
operation, even though the Blue Jays broke the MLB attendance record by drawing more
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than four million fans, the stadium had an operating loss of almost $16 million. 67 After
years of trying to finance the operation and debt service of the stadium, the province
finally sold it in March of 1994 to a private consortium for only $111 million, 80 meaning
Ontario taxpayers suffered a $2 1 1 million loss that will not be recouped until halfway






A number of issues which orbit and interact with professional sports could affect
the continuation or expansion of the push to build more stadiums. Pro sports teams use a
variety of special provisions to maintain bargaining leverage, obtain public funding, and
avoid taxes. Their status may eventually diminish, though, with legislative measures,
cooperative pacts, and lawsuits — all of which are meant to eliminate the anti-trust
exemptions, loopholes in tax laws, and strict ownership rules that teams use to fuel private
growth at public expense.
Threats and Promises
Whether to wrest funding for a new stadium or enhance the sale price of a team,
sports franchises, like many other businesses that negotiate with cities, often use
unreasonable threats to seize the upper hand in bargaining power and establish a rationale
for leaving if negotiations break down. 170
Almost every new or renovated sports facility, and the public funding thereof, is
leveraged, in part, by the threat of team relocation or an actual move. Fifteen teams
changed locations between 1970 and 1990, including those who made went from urban to
suburban facilities; still others got new or refurbished arenas by threatening to leave. 171
Recent examples of the latter include baseball's Chicago White Sox, football's San Diego
Chargers, and hockey's New Jersey Devils. The White Sox, who toyed with the idea of
leaving town for years, were built 27 new skyboxes in their old stadium in 1982 in return
for a promise to stay, but by 1985, they had already begun the process of again
threatening to leave unless given a new stadium. 15 White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf
blatantly acknowledged the strategy of making threats and using hopeful communities,
like Tampa Bay, to get a new facility: "We had to make threats to get the new deal. Ifwe
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didn't have the threat of moving, we wouldn't have gotten the deal."
172
The recent
decision to renovate the Chargers' stadium quelled their threats, but led to renewed threats
by the MLB Padres, who share the Chargers' stadium under a lease that expires in 1999,
to leave unless a baseball-only stadium is constructed for them. The Devils nearly left
for Nashville, but stayed in New Jersey when given $25 million in lease concessions at
their arena. Other threats continue. The prospective new owner of the Seattle Seahawks
NFL team is basing his purchase on the contingency that voters approve a tax increase to
fund a $200 million stadium for the team. 173 The Milwaukee Brewers hinted at relocation
if the public contribution for a new stadium was not enough for their liking.
174
The
(separate) owners of Cincinnati's Reds and Bengals threatened moves to Kentucky and
Baltimore, respectively, before each getting public funding for new stadiums. 136 Threats
also help owners whose teams are for sale, as explained by the president of the Pittsburgh
Pirates: "You have to use the threat of relocation as leverage to attract local ownership.
Without it, a team cannot be sold for a fair price." 175
Usually, threats produce the desired result of a new or overhauled stadium, or at
least a more favorable lease. Actual moves have not occurred often in basketball or
baseball, which last saw a relocation in 1971, when the Washington Senators moved to
Arlington, Texas, and became the Rangers. 70 The NHL has the most lenient policy
toward franchise moves — the Winnipeg Jets will become the third NHL team to change
homes in the last three years when they move to Phoenix in the fall of 1996, though all
were the result of poor support. The NFL, on the other hand, has seen seven franchises
change homes since 1982, 126 and, except for the Giants' and Jets' move across the river to
New Jersey, all involved drawn-out and emotional battles. With the stadium boom just
beginning in the NFL, and with the significantly higher costs associated with their
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facilities (especially if single-purpose, as is the trend), football could see even more
franchise shifts in the years ahead.
While the sports leagues, especially the NFL, claim they are '"powerless to stop"
such movements, others, like Representative Martin Hoke (R-Ohio) say they choose not
to: "It's not that leagues can't restrict team movement. It's that they refuse to do so,
because it's clearly against the owners' economic interest."
126 The NFL would contend
that remark, pointing to the recent hiring of Richard Horrow, a Miami-based lawyer and
stadium development consultant, to help cities keep their football teams by "negotiating
leases, coming up with financing plans, and mediating disputes." 1 Team owners,
however, especially in the NFL, like having the ever-possible relocation threat as leverage,
and are not likely to set a precedent that could undermine their own interests. As Browns
owner Art Modell told fellow owners when he decided to relocate the team to Baltimore:
"If this league allows the mayor [of Cleveland] to hold the Browns hostage, then every
1 77
one ofyou are hostages, too."
If the leagues indeed are "powerless" to stop team moves, some believe that
governments are not. Regulations that monitor the relocation of sports franchises have
been proposed, though never passed, for years, as they were during Congress' 1984-1985
session.
177
With the current booms of facility construction, public investment, and team
worth showing no signs of slowing, however, such rules may find new life. Legislation
was recently introduced by Congressman Hoke that would govern the parameters of team
moves. The Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act requires ( 1 ) team owners to
give a six months notice of an intent to move; (2) the league to hold two public hearings
before granting relocation approval; and (3) the league to grant the jilted city a new team
within four years if the former team left despite being profitable. 179 The act would also
permit team ownership by public trusts or municipalities, currently forbidden by the
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NFL. 126 The bill is not expected to pass, but nonetheless has "if you build it ..." cities,
like Nashville, concerned that just the discussion of such a measure could retard efforts to
proceed with their stadium's construction. 101
Conversely, Financial World suggests that allowing teams to change locations "at
will" would ensure that teams are located in cities that support them, thereby reducing
"the need for government subsidies in those cities that cannot, or will not, back a team."
Non-legislative attempts to unify cities and states against the threats of pro
franchises have also been attempted, but have failed when cities are tempted by the
prospect of getting a new team. The National Governors Association, for example, in
1984 passed a resolution "calling for safeguards against franchise movement when host
cities have a record of supporting the franchise." 180 Shortly thereafter, however, the
governor of Maryland, despite having just watched his state's NFL franchise lured away
by another city, lobbied for Baltimore as a possible new home for the NFL Cardinals,
who were unhappy in St. Louis. 180
The most drastic efforts to combat the relocation threat took place in Oakland and
Baltimore, which went as far as attempting unprecedented legal action to keep their NFL
franchises. Arguing that the Raiders were "an important part of the city's economic and
social makeup and that the city had the right to seize the franchise to protect those public
interests," the city of Oakland filed an eminent domain suit against the team in 1980. 181
The suit failed, as the courts were unwilling to establish a precedent for such a broad
interpretation of the powerful tool of eminent domain, asserting that it would be
"dangerous and heavy-handed for a government to take over a business, including all of
its intangible assets, for the sole purpose of preventing its relocation." 182 Baltimore filed
a similar suit to keep the Colts, but did so too late to have the case even heard. 183




Anti-trust laws exist to prevent monopolies from being formed by businesses that
attempt to "restrain the activities of competitors or potential competitors."
1&4 The major
professional sports are given immunity to these laws, either explicitly, as in baseball, or
implicitly, as with the others. Baseball's specific exemption is based on a 1922 U.S.
Supreme Court decision that determined that baseball was ( 1 ) an intrastate activity
"played within the borders of a single state" and not subject, therefore, to federal statutes;
and (2) not subject to anti-trust scrutiny because it "was more a game or amusement than a
business."
184 The exemption still stands, even though the definition of interstate
commerce has been broadened, 184 and baseball, or any other major league professional
sport, is obviously now more than "a game or amusement."
Court decisions involving the matter of pro sports leagues' anti-trust status
usually revolve around the question of whether the leagues are single entities or a
collection of businesses -- cooperation within the latter would violate the anti-trust
laws.
185 Such decisions have held that the leagues are both, and that they should be
allowed to cooperate on some matters (scheduling, for example), but not on others
(collusion to deny franchises to cities, for example). 185 The most important decision
involving anti-trust was the 1980 suit filed jointly by the Oakland Raiders and Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission against the NFL for attempting to stop the
team's move to LA. In May 1982, a U.S. District Court jury found that the NFL's
attempted block "was an attempt to prevent competition with the (L.A.) Rams or to keep
the market open for a later expansion team." 186 This decision was crucial because it made
the NFL fearful of challenging other attempts to move, like the Colts', even though league
bylaws called for the consent of the other team owners. 187 NFL Commissioner Paul
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Tagliabue, in recent testimony before Congress, asked for the explicit anti-trust protection
that baseball enjoys in order to have the ability to veto franchise moves. 30
As with franchise relocation, some call for a Congressional review of pro sports'
operations and privileges, but, as written in Financial World, "for decades. Congress has
treated big-time sports as if they were games adults play, and has never imposed the usual
regulatory restraints such as antitrust. In effect, this has permitted management of the
teams in each of the four major sports leagues to work in concert, in what some critics ...
maintain is anti-competitive."
9
Specifically, it has allowed the leagues to control the
number of franchises, pool resources with revenue sharing, control player movement and
salaries, and gain public funding for new stadiums.
Critics argue that because of their anti-trust exemption, professional sports
leagues are essentially "cartels,"
1 3
whose teams posses monopolistic powers that allow
them to get public funding for new venues by threatening to leave. The leagues have used
supply (of new teams - limited by the leagues) and demand (for new teams - by willing
cities), they contend, to limit the number of teams, thereby ensuring a constant pool of
cities that want a new team. Economist Roger Noll of Stanford University states: "The
main rationale for the shortage of teams is to create a bidding war among cities for teams
because limiting the number of franchises gives team owners enormous market power in
dealing with localities in getting local subsidies."
83
Before Tampa Bay was finally
awarded a baseball team the executive director of the players' union asserted that it was
by MLB design: "If you put a team in Tampa, [owners like the Chicago White Sox' Jerry]
Reinsdorf can't extort money from the city of Chicago by threatening to move to Tampa.
That's worth more to him than any number of expansion teams." 188
Years ago, shear population size usually determined whether or not a city was
franchise-capable.
189 Now, stadium revenues and politics play a much larger role. As a
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condition of the Browns' departure for Baltimore
,
Cleveland obtained a legally-binding
promise from the NFL to grant the city a replacement for the Browns by 1999.
Because of that, and the fact that NFL owners do not want the pot of television revenues
divided up more with expansion teams, the nation's second largest city, Los Angeles, may
go for years without a professional football team of its own.
1 The NFL, in fact, has
been the most effective user of the special status granted to professional sports by sharing
more revenues amongst its teams than the other sports which has led, ultimately, to higher
average franchise values in that league.
Author Charles Euchner contends that the monopoly status that the pro sports
leagues enjoy has allowed teams "to control the tempo and scope of political
confrontations."
192
Houston Mayor Robert Lanier, who refused to publicly subsidize a
new stadium for the NFL Oilers stated: "Cities now build stadiums for football teams out
of fear. NFL franchises have been granted monopoly favors by the U.S. government, and
they're abusing that power by extorting tax dollars from communities across the
country."
126
The "cartel" mode of operations used by the pro sports leagues, Euchner argues,
is evidenced by their intervention on behalf of member franchises to help gain
government financial support.
19 The leagues themselves are often willing partners with
teams in making threats, pleas, or promises to cities and states in order to get new
facilities built. The San Antonio Spurs have played in the Alamodome, a facility built
primarily for football, since it was completed in 1993. Though seven years remain on
their lease, the team has made recent overtures about needing a new facility to remain
"financially competitive," prompting the following comments from the NBA's Deputy
Commissioner: "I think, long-term, it's a difficult prospect. The Alamodome is not a
state-of-the-art basketball facility. It has to do with luxury suites and the suites being in
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places suitable for corporate ownership and for their entertainment purposes." ' In 1990,
Cleveland voters were told by MLB Commissioner Fay Vincent that their MLB Indians
would leave if a 15-year sin tax to help pay for a new stadium was not approved.
Baseball's executive council conditionally awarded Milwaukee the 1999 All-Star Game if
it promised to build a new stadium by then. 194 A group of Houston politicians was told
by NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue that, if the Oilers leave for Nashville, they would
"likely" get a new team if that team was guaranteed annual revenues of at least $70
million in a new stadium.
195 The mayors of Boston and Houston were promised by NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue "'strong consideration" for future Super Bowls if they built
new stadiums.
196 While testifying before a state panel considering the construction of a
new stadium, the owner of the New England Patriots was accompanied by an NFL vice-
president who urged the state to build the facility "to allow the Patriots to be competitive
against teams playing in newer facilities that guarantee them larger revenues."8 '
Tax-Exempt Bonds and Sports Authorities
Many of the public initiatives to build or renovate sports facilities involve the use
of tax-exempt bonds. Typical stadium financing packages include tax-exempt "general
obligation" bonds, other tax-exempt bonds (such as those backed by bed or sales taxes),
taxable bonds backed by anticipated stadium revenues, or a combination thereof. ' The
vast majority of the funding for the Florida Panthers' new arena, for example, is derived
from $160 million worth of tax-exempt bonds backed by a bed tax increase. 198
Cleveland's Gateway Project was funded, in part, by a $1 17 million, tax-exempt bond
that could have cost $30 million to $40 million more had it been taxable; 154 the city's
proposed new football stadium similarly relies on tax-exempt bonds for $140 million of
its $220 million total construction cost. 199 The Ice Palace in Tampa was financed with a
combination of taxable and tax-exempt bonds. 197 Opposition to the use of these bonds
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for, essentially, private enterprise is growing, however. Teams and communities may
have to scrap or re-work plans for new arenas if tax-exempt bonds are banned since the
cost of borrowing money would escalate, substantially increasing the total cost of
construction.
In early 1996, the Congressional Research Service released a report that
"questioned the value of providing either federal or state subsidies for pro sports
facilities" and called for a closure of a loophole in the 1986 Tax Reform Act that, while
banning the use of "private-activity" bonds for stadiums, still allowed cities to use
"governmental-purpose" bonds for the same. 200 Acting on that report, U.S. Senator
Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N. Y.) recently introduced legislation that would prohibit the use
of all state or local government bonds to build pro sports facilities. 201 The key difference
between private-activity and government-purpose bonds is that the former are fully
taxable, while the latter are tax-exempt. The legislation's intent is to "restore the original
purpose of municipal tax-exempt bonds, which is to fund projects with a traditional
government purpose."201 Moynihan says the 1986 law was meant to stop all uses of tax-
exempt bonds for sports stadiums, and that the loophole hurts governments by "requiring
them to offer more favorable lease terms to professional tenants and to finance their
subsidy with general revenue rather than by user charges and rents."202
Like the franchise relocation measure, Moynihan' s legislation, officially called
STADIA (Stop Tax-exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act),203 is given little chance of passage,
but has several communities wary of proceeding with their own planned usage of tax-
exempt bonds.204 In Denver, voters will decide in November 1997 whether or not to
adopt a 0. 1 percent sales tax increase to build the NFL Broncos a new $180 million
stadium using tax-exempt bonds. Under Moynihan 's legislative change, however, which
would affect bonds issued on or after June 14, 1996, 1" taxable bonds would have to be
63

issued and, because of the higher rate of return that would have to be paid to the bonds'
investors, Denver-area taxpayers' costs would substantially increase - as much as $3.8
million in the first year alone.
203
Stadium proposals in Miami, Cincinnati, and
Milwaukee, among others, also rely heavily on tax-exempt bond issues, and could be in
doubt if STADIA passes. 199
A method of avoiding both the tax burden of a sports facility and the possible
public resistance to financing it is to create local "sports authorities." Sports authorities
(or stadium districts) are established to act as the city's arm for coordinating property
matters, negotiating with teams, and overseeing facilities, but often are also granted the
ability to provide public financial support for projects without having to get public
approval to do so. 67 Sports authorities often "own" a city's sports venues, then lease them
to the teams, usually for a low price, so that the team is not burdened with the (tax)
responsibility of owning the facility. In Fort Worth, Texas, for example, a privately-
funded motor speedway currently under construction will be annexed by the city, then
owned by the city's sports authority. The authority, as a public, non-profit corporation,
enjoys a tax-exempt status, meaning that property taxes cannot be collected on the full
value of the speedway.206 The local school board, of course, is vehemently opposed, as it
stands to lose up to $1.5 million a year in tax proceeds because of the exemption.206 The
public-subsidy-for-private-investment debate often involves these sports authorities, as in
Phoenix, where the expansion baseball team's stadium is under construction. The 23-acre
site it occupies was acquired, in part, through legal condemnation proceedings filed by the
Maricopa Stadium District against 20 individual property owners. 207 Landowners were
unsuccessful in blocking the condemnation, but a dissenting judge on the state's Court of
Appeals argued that the procedure should have been disallowed "under the guise that it
would benefit the public" because of the agreement that, again, called for the Stadium
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District to own the ballpark and lease it to the team for a sum deemed to be below fair
market value.
208
The other reason it pays to keep a team's rent low relates back to the
1986 Tax Reform Act. That law permitted stadium bonds to keep a tax-exempt status as




In the future, as the arena construction and stadium revenue booms settle, teams
will undoubtedly search for new ways to generate cash. Some experts believe one of
these avenues will be public ownership.
209
Cities and states also like the idea, but for
other reasons. During an "emergency summit" of U.S. mayors, convened in January 1996
to consider the dilemmas posed by pro sports teams, public team ownership was among
the most-discussed ideas for controlling the costs of, and threats by, pro franchises. 177
Public ownership is neither a new, nor totally untested, idea, having succeeded in
the Pennsylvania cities of Harrisburg and Scranton, each ofwhom purchased minor
league baseball teams in the last seven years.
1 Given the lower budgets and affiliations
(with big-league teams) these teams enjoy, though, they are poorer models of major
league public ownership than are the Green Bay Packers and Boston Celtics, this
country's only publicly-owned major league sports teams.
The Packers are owned by roughly 1,900 individual shareholders, mostly local
residents, and are not much of a threat to leave town since the fans themselves are the
owner.
210
The team sold shares in the 1920s and 1950s "to avoid insolvency,"50 setting a
purchase cap to avoid majority control by one shareholder. 177 The Packers are a rarity,
however, having been "grandfathered" into the NFL's rules, which stipulate that one
person must have operating control of the team. 21 ' The reason for such a rule relates back
to team owners' desire to maintain the power and worth of their teams, which depend
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greatly on the "freedom to move to more lucrative territory."
1
If more teams are
publicly held and, therefore, not likely to leave, the logic goes, the leverage gained by the
threat of relocation is diminished, along with the chance of greater public funding.
Baseball also has a dim view of public ownership — the owner of the San Diego Padres
discussed transferring ownership of that team to the city in 1990, but was rejected by
MLB. 211
Like it or not, the leagues may eventually be forced to accept the idea, though;
either judicially or legislatively. The former owner of the New England Patriots has an
ongoing $50 million lawsuit against the NFL for not allowing him to take that team public
in the late 1980s.
137
Using the Packers as a model, a New York assemblyman recently
drafted a bill that would create a state sports authority "to sell bonds, buy a team, and then
offer team shares for public purchase."
177
Experts differ on the feasibility of government ownership. Daniel Alesch, a
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay professor, believes it could work in the NFL, as with
the Packers. "You'd have to come up with an upfront investment, but it's very likely to
become profitable. You can contract out to real football people to run the team, and the
thing can become self-sustaining." 177 Others, like David Peterson, managing director of
Price Waterhouse's sports consulting group, contend that the high costs involved with
teams today would place undue risk on the government. 177
While not generally in favor of public ownership, baseball, along with hockey
and basketball, has no formal provision prohibiting it. 177 The NBA, in fact, has this
country's only publicly-owned and traded franchise, the Boston Celtics, who have traded
on "the big board" as a tax-free limited partnership since 1986. 20" The Celtics' principal
owners raised $40 million from the sale of stock to 68,000 shareholders at an initial price
of $18.50 per share, and retain total control "over finances, profit distribution, and
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executive compensation to the general partners."212 The Celtics were not even the first
NBA team to try such ownership. The Milwaukee Bucks and Cleveland Cavaliers were
publicly held in the 1970s before taken private later, and the Denver Nuggets attempted to
sell shares after witnessing the Celtics' success, but abandoned the idea after minimal
. 212
mterest.
The idea has again resurfaced, though, as teams seek other avenues to defray the
cost of making money (by building new facilities). Following in the Celtics' footsteps,
and those of the Toronto Maple Leafs (Canada's only publicly-traded pro team), the
Florida Panthers are awaiting the approval of federal regulators and the NHL to sell a
portion of the team on Wall Street. 212 Discussions involving the recent purchase of the
NBA Dallas Mavericks included the possibility of placing "the team, its arena, and several
broadcast properties under one corporate umbrella and then tak[ing] the entity public." 14






Despite its many controversies, professional sports continue to thrive, and despite
their enormous costs, arenas continue to be built. Appendix A contains Tables 3, 4, 5,
and 6, which summarize the estimated worth and stadium situations of each of the 113
major league professional teams. An inspection of these tables reveals that:
1
.
Teams that are worth the most are those in stadiums that are new or renovated
and/or are owned, or leased under generous terms, by the team.
2. Virtually every team, in all four sports, either has a new or renovated arena
and/or new lease; is about to get a new or renovated arena and/or new lease;
or wants to get a new or renovated arena and/or new lease. The few
exceptions, like the Miami Dolphins, Boston Red Sox, Los Angeles Lakers,
and Detroit Red Wings, already rank among their league's leaders in both
revenues and team worth.
Some believe the promise franchises and stadiums hold for cities is a mirage;
others cite them as keys to economic renewal and civic pride. One Buffalo economist
compared the current rush to build sports facilities to the fall of the Roman Empire: "To
placate the masses and distract them from their economic problems, the Roman Caesars
spent vast sums on bread and circuses. We're doing the same thing today, only we call it
sports / economic development."37 Sports economist Robert Baade also waxes historical:
"It's an edifice complex. The Egyptians built pyramids. We build stadiums, shopping
malls, and casinos."95 Owners counter that critics fail to consider the money teams often
pay back to their cities. Pittsburgh's three professional teams, for example, each pay a 5
percent amusement tax that goes directly into the city's general fund. 46
68

Certainly, cities that are the most successful in promoting growth and fiscal
revival are those that use sports teams and their arenas as an element of a comprehensive
economic revitalization plan, not the whole of it. Cities that place an over-emphasis on
pro sports often assume a position of lesser bargaining power, and, by putting the
economic cart before the horse, may involve their communities in ventures that are not
sustainable over a long period. Author Charles Euchner:
Whatever cities do to take on the sports industry, they will be vulnerable unless they
improve their economic and political conditions apart from sports. Cities are most
vulnerable to the relocation threats of businesses - manufacturing and service firms as
well as sports franchises - when they do not have the fundamental building blocks of
urban prosperity and a good quality of life. 213
The tremendous growth of sports - pro teams are appreciating at 1 5 percent a
year, according to University of Texas at Dallas economist Gerald Scully
1
- may continue
to the point where average citizens can no longer afford to attend the games. Seat
licenses, luxury suites, and rising ticket prices (7-8 percent annually in all four major
sports since the 1970s),
106
necessities in the teams' eyes, are imposing new demographics
on the fan base of professional sports. Even with new stadiums and their revenue-
generating amenities, enough may never be enough. Financial World predicts that MLB,
the NFL, and the NBA "are steadily approaching middle age," and that stadium revenues
alone will not be enough to sustain future gains in profitability and worth. 9 As such,
corporate ownership will continue to increase — some experts even predict that teams will
one day bear the name of their corporate owner, as do professional baseball teams in
Japan, not their home city or state. 106
Even greater sources of revenue will be needed if the frequent reliance on public
money to build these stadiums is curtailed. The growing resentment of pro sports" many
special privileges and exemptions may one day result in a more market-based approach to
building stadiums, as wishfully editorialized by The National Review: "Team owners and
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players, insulated by taxpayers from the cost of stadium financing, are doing extremely
well without having to exert themselves to meet the demands of their market ... if new
stadiums and arenas have economic value, individuals acting in the marketplace will see
that such facilities are built without government intervention.'"
124
Especially galling to the
critics of public funding for arenas and ballparks are the city-versus-city battles to get or
keep a team, most of which end up (only) benefitting the teams. As the bar is raised by
one team's success in getting funding or lease concessions, other teams seek to do
likewise. The NFL's benchmark, for example, was set by St. Louis, Oakland, and
Jacksonville, then set again, only higher, by Baltimore. Cooperative efforts and sound
project delivery systems help assuage individual cities' concerns, but the use of threats
and existence of "ifyou build it ..." strategies to help lend credence to those threats make
bidding wars inevitable.
Governments have shied away from confronting the pro sports leagues on such
matters, but that, too, may change, as evidenced by Congressman Hoke's franchise
relocation act and Senator Moynihan's proposal to limit the use of tax-exempt bonds.
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a series of hearings in late 1995 and early 1996 to
review franchise relocation, anti-trust revenue sharing, and other professional sports
issues. Among the witnesses was Stephen Ross, a professor at the University of Illinois,
who focused specifically on the NFL, and urged Congress to either: ( 1 ) re-create the
American Football League (by repealing the 1966 legislation that merged that league with
the NFL) in order to re-establish competition by ending "the artificial limit on expansion"
and deny the NFL's request for explicit anti-trust exemption; or (2) prohibit the use of tax
subsidies to either retain or lure franchises and require the NFL to share all stadium
revenues.
214
In arguing the case for the latter suggestions, Professor Ross used the Oilers'
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impending move to Nashville to demonstrate that the current system of NFL revenue
sharing gives owners a financial incentive to milk public funds:
If the Oilers win big on the field, they might have many sell-outs and ticket prices at
the Astrodome could rise considerably, but Mr. Adams [team owner] will have to
share 40% of this source of income. If the Oilers' players are popular. Oiler jackets,
hats, helmets, and other paraphernalia might become big sellers, but Mr. Adams simply
shares 1/30 of all profits from NFL Properties. If the Oilers design an exciting offense
that attracts major television revenues, both in Houston and across the country, Mr.
Adams simply shares 1/30 in the profits. However, if Mr. Adams can get a multi-
million tax subsidy, he keeps it himself. This is not the way free enterprise is supposed
to work in this society, and this Committee is the appropriate body to call a halt to
these practices.
214
Surely, though, no matter how the financing is arranged or where the teams are
located, the building boom will continue, especially with the trend (back) toward single-
purpose stadiums in football and baseball. Ironically, the city of Houston started the
multi-purpose stadium trend with the opening of the Astrodome in 1965,215 but is now on
the verge of losing both the football and baseball tenants of that facility because each
wants its own arena. In further irony, the Astrodome was also the first stadium to feature
skyboxes,216 a key component of the package luring the Oilers toward Nashville. Kansas
City, on the other hand, which may be the only city currently hosting a major pro sport
that has not faced some sort of team-departure threat211 was 20 years ahead of its time in
building single-purpose stadiums for the Chiefs and Royals in the early 1970s.
Teams may need such adroit forecasting skills to keep pace with their fellow
teams and finance a payroll big enough to remain competitive, all while not alienating the
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